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This report to the Virtual Elimination Task Force of the International Joint
Commission was prepared under the direction of the Task Force’s Economic
Subgroup. The statements and views presentedin this report are those of VHB
Research and Consulting and do not necessarily represent the views or policies
of the International Joint Commission. its Boards or its committees.
 
The Task Force notes that some of the information contained herein has been
superseded by more recent information. Also. the use of older data does not
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Problems With the Current Regulatory Framework
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6.2 The Control of Mercury Discharges
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This study examines the roles that economic instruments might play in achieving the "virtual elimination" oi discharges
of persrstent toxic substances to the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem. The specific objectives of this study are:
1. To define and assess the role of economic instruments as a means to the virtual elimination of emissions of persistent
toxic Substances to the Great Lakes environment.
2. To assess economic instruments as a means to achieve the virtual elimination of PCBs and mercury entering the Great
Lakes environment.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































design and iurther analysis oi a program oi economic instruments ior the pup and paper industry consisting oi:
- Financial enlorcement incentives to support regulations designed to virtually eliminate 2.3.7.8—TCDD/TCDF.
A tradeable permits scheme to reduce the use oi chlorine.































The main oblective of this study is to provide the Joint Task Force on the Virtual Elimination of Persistent Toxic
Substances with an understanding of t e roles that economic instmments might play in achieving the ‘virtual elimination' of
discharges of persnstent toxic substances to the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem.
The use of economic instruments to achieve the objectives of the Great Ldtes Water Quality Agreement does not imply
any change in these objectives. The pu 059 of this study is simply to explore whether the goal of virtual elimination can be
achieved more ﬂuidity, more cheaply a or with lesssocial dismption by employing economic instruments than by only usmg
more traditional orms of environmental regulation.
The specific objectives of this study are:
1. To define and assess the role of economic instruments as a means to the virtual elimination of emissions of persistent
toxic substances to the Great Lakes environment.
2. To assess economic instniments as a means to achieve the virtual elimination of PCBs and mercury entering the Great
Lakes environment.
3. To assess economic instruments as a means to achieve the virtual elimination of persistent toxic emissions to the Great
Lakes by the pup and paper industry in Canada and the United States.
1.2 Approach
The argument for the use of economic instruments in environmental policy is one that has long been made in the
journals of the economic and legal professions. Recently, economic instruments-traceable permits in particular-- have shown
signs of becoming popular in the political and bureaucratic milieux as well.
However. actual experience with economic instruments to induce the reduction of emissions of wastes into the
environment is quite limited. As a result. policy mdters have a very limited empirical basis for deciding whether and how to





















































(grants, soft-loans and tax allowances)
(refunddile deposits charged on products)
(non-compliance fees and performance bonds)
- subsidies
- deposit-refund systems


























































































































































The evaluation oi economic instruments tor achieving virtual elimination oi persistent toxics is considered on two levels.
ﬁrst. a generalized lramework tor evaluation is oilered that can be used to evaluate economic instruments tor attaining


































































ramework also gives some guidance as to what sort oi iniormation must be gathered in order to make a choice oi policy
instrument. This evaluation iramework takes the lorm ol a how chart or 'decision tree" (Figure 5.1).
While this "decision tree" sets out criteria and lntonnation requirements for decision making, it does not provide a
lormula tor producing answers automatically. The criteria span a wide range oi social, political. environmental and economic
issues and the relative weights to be given to the various criteria cannot be decided in advance. Weighing the survival oi one
industry towns against envrrcnmental damage or either one against wider macroeconomic impacts requires a sensitivity to a
wide range at considerations and should be undertaken by people who are well inlormed and responsible to those who will
leel the consequences of any resulting decision.






















rsistent toxics in the Great Lakes basin. it each case. a summary oi the available inlonnation is given; t n the iniomiation
is reviewed using thedecision tree to consider whether the use oi an economic instrument might be appropriate.
1.3 Scope
















































accumulating and doing harm within the Great Lures basin.























































































identitied by the Water Quality Board oi the International Joint Commission in 1985 (Table 1.1).
Tails 1.1 IJC Critical Pollutants




2,3,7,8- Tetrachlorodibenzo-pdioxln (2.3.7.8- TCDD)




















































































































































toxic emissions trom the pup and pwer industry in the Great Lates basin.



































1.4 Plan of the Report
Chapter 2 offers working definitions oi a number oi the terms used in this paper--'virtual elimination." 'zero discharge"
and “persistent toxic substance” -- and provides a description oi each economic instrument considered.
Chapter 3 descnbes the general nature oi the regulatory framework currently being applied to control emissions oi
persistent toxic substances in the Great Lakes basin and discusses the limitations oi that iramework.
Chapter 4 gives a bnei overview oi the use oi economic instruments in a number oi jurisdictions. Some conclusions are
drawn from the experiences oi these jurisdictions.
Chapter 5 presents the general evaluation iramework.
Chapter 6 takes u the speciilc issue of the applicability oi economic instruments to the virtual elimination oi discharges
oi mercury to the reat Lakes basin.
Chapter 7 does the same as Chapter 6. but for P083.
Chapters 8 and 9 provide a description oi the pulp and paper industry in the Great Lakes basin and consider the
possibility oi using economic instruments to virtually eliminate toxic discharges irom pup and paper mills.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.0 THE REGULATION OF PERSISTENT TOXICS
IN THE GREAT LAKES
The purpose oi this chapter is to provide a briei description of the existing approach taken to regulating the discharge oi
persistent toxlcs into the Great Lakes with special relerence to the pulp and paper sector.
3.1 Canada
Canadian water pollution regulation rests on two pillars: general prohibitions on the discharge oi pollutants to any
watercourse: and individualized. negotiated agreements between dischargers and regulatory authorities on exemptions irom
the general prohibition. which deiine permissible and oi the ope eliiuent loadings. Both Canadian iederal and Ontario
provmcial law place general prohibitions on the discharge oi harm ul substances to surfer» waters. in Ontario, these laws are
enlorced primarily by the provincial government.
While large numbers oi industrial and municipal dlschargers continue to produce effluents which are toxic to marine iile.



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The US. EPA is currently in a review of technology-based effluent limits for all pup, paper and moar






















and New Source Performance Standards l SPS) effluent limits for priority pollutants released from mills which bleach pulp
with chlorine are also under review. Pretreatment standards for chlorine bleaching mills which discharge to sewage treatment
plants are being reconsidered. The US. EPA will decide whether to revise existing regulations as well as whether to regulate
dioxins. iurans and organochlorine compounds. Final new rules are not expected to be promulgated until mid~1995.
There are several other r ulatory initiatives that will have an impact on toxics in the Great Lakes. Under the Great
Lakes Critical Programs Act oi 1 uniform water quality standards are to be prepared for the US. by June 1992. Draft
standards will be published in the Federal R later in June 1991. States are to adopt water quality standards at least as strict
as the federal standards by June 30, 1992. e Great Lakes Critical Programs Act also sets deadlines for the completion of
Remedial Action Plans in the US. and for the Lake Michigan Management Plan. Late cleanup plans are to be incorporated
into state water quality plans by 1993 or 3.5 years after designation.
On February 7. 1991 the US. EPA announced its industrial Toxics Protect. Under this protect. 17 toxic chemicals have
been identified on the basis oi seriousness oi effects. actual ex sure levels. high release volume and recognised potential for
reducing releases. (Mercury is included but PCBs are not.) he goal of this voluntary pr ram is to achieve a one third
reduction in total releases and transfers (to sewage treatment ants and landfills) of these 1 chemicals by 1992 and a one
half reduction by 1995 a ainst a 1988 baseline. A 90% vo untary reduction earns a six-year deierrai of Clean Air Act
technology-based standar s.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Economic instruments are now widely used in environmental re uiation. in a survey oi 14 countries in the Organization
tor Economic Cooperation and Development. done in 1986 and 19 7, the use oi 153 dtiierent instruments was identitied
lOECD 1989). Charges. emissions trading, and other economic instruments are currently being considered ior application to
a wide variety oi environmental problems. Appendix A provides a summary of the OECD 1989 survey in tabular lorrn.
The application ol most oi these instruments to the problem oi achievin "virtual elimination” oi a toxic substance is.
however. quite limited. Most oi the instruments identitied are used largely tor lnanclal reasons -- to raise money to pay ior
administration oi programs or to pay ior cleanups. These money-raising instruments have a limited incentive eiiect.
Oi these measures which are explicitly designed to have an incentive eilect. most have been lied to shift
consumption activities in gradual ways. For instance tax dillerentiation has been imposed between leaded an unleaded luel
or between more and less energy-eiiiclent vehicles; and product charges and relundmle deposits have been applied to
containers. car hullrs and batteries.
While eiiluent char as have been applied to direct discharges oi eliluents from m r industrial and munic al sources.
in every instance but two (lite. ior water lution control in the iorrner West Germany and t e Netherlands) these c arges have
been too low to have any signiiicant e set on discharges. Even in the West German case, where these incentives have been
the most successiul. charges are levied at only mout one quarter ol average abatement costs.
The one lonn oi economic instrument which has been applied to a llutant lor the specific purpose ol reducing
discharges to a ne llglbie lovel ls emissions trading. in the United States, em sslons trading has been used to bring about a
rapid decrease in t e level oi lead in automotive luel and it is currently being used to reduce emissions oi ozone depleting
substances.
 
The use oi economic instruments to cover administrative program costs, to reduce the use oi materials whose
production creates pollution and to reduce the disposal ol tentlally harmlul products such asmercury-containin batteries
may rove oi no small assistance in achieving the "virtual e lmlnatlon' of persistent toxic discharges to the Great L as basin.
But i e dramatic reductions in discharges which are necessary to achieve 'virtual elimination“ can only be brought about by
the systematic application oi either direct regulation or economic instruments, or a combination of the two, to all at the maior
sources oi a given persistent toxic.
This chapter takes a closer look at live applications oi economic instruments lrom which lessons can be learned
regarding the potential eiiectlveness oi these instruments ior achieving ‘vlnual elimination.‘ While eliluent charges have not
been demonstrated to be able to produce the necessary reductions in and oi themselves-4i only because no government has
yet been repared to institute an eltiuent chuge high enough to induce such aresult -- the German water oilutlon eliluent
charges 0 provide an exarrple oi an instance where charges have at least hoped to encourage a sign ant degree of
pollution reduction. in addition to eilluent charges on discharges to water in West Germany, three applications oi emissions
trading are reviewed: to reduce lead in gasoline, to reduce the release oi ozone depletl substances, and to control 800
lbiological oxygen demand) disdwges into the Fox River, Wisconsin. A brlei outline ol t emissions trading provisions oi
the US. Clean Air Act is also included.
4.2 Effluent Charges in West Germany
The West German eilluent change scheme was announced in 1976 and implemented in i981. It miles on a
nationwide level to any efﬂuent source. although it is applied by provincial ('Laender') authorities.
Originally the scheme mplied to five pollutants and pollutant groups: oxygen depleting substances,
high-organic-content solids. low-org‘anlc content solids. mercury and cadmium: as well as to discharges toxic to iish. in 1989,
A X iadsorbable organic halide), c romium, nickel. lead and copper were also included.
Ever; dischar r oi a re latedfollutant is r uired to have a germit. Fees are assessed per 'damage unit" (19.20
European urrency nits (ECUyuor 40 eutsch mark i M) or $16.70 U. .) and damage units are calculated lor each r ulated
category. However, the actual lee paid also varies according to whether the disoharger meets a lederally set mnlmum










Estimate/6.1 Fee Paid ‘
Over standard 1.0 x Expected drscharge'
75-100% oi standard 0.5 x Standard
50-75% oi standard 0.5 x Actual discharge
Under 50% ct standard No tee
Use “state oi the art technology" 0.2 x Expected disdrarge'
'ii "expected discharge” is exceeded. a corrective payment is required. Source: O.E.C.D. (1989)
West German water quality is believed to have improved signiiicantiy since 1976. By 1981. alter a long introduction
period, 10% oi dischargers met federal minimum standards. By 1987, roughly 50% oi dischargers were meeting those
standards.
While the treatment cost of German dischargers averages about tour times higher than applicrtle charges. suggesting
that direct regulation is the moving iorce behind the improvements. the charges do exceed many llnns‘ marginal abatement
costs. A number oi large dischar are known to have exceeded minimum requirements to achieve reduce payable tees
and one third oi all aliected mun‘ alittes claim that the charge was their main reason tor intensifying wastewater treatment.
In 1986. the charge system produced ECU 135 million (U.S.S 111 million), wout hall oi which was spent on administration oi
the program.
According to the Economic Councillor Europe (ECE) Council oi Experts. the German system results in a saving oi one
third in companson with a System oi uniiorm statement.
4.3 Emissions Trading In the United States
















































or tour kinds oi trades:
Nelltg:



























































































most cost-etiective way. in praalce. most bubbles are applied to individual plants and sometimes two. 89 State






















systems had been waved by the U.S. EPA.
One Canadian commentator (Environment Canada 1990) has observed that trading works best it:
- trading is introduced at the start at a program;
' the rules are stable. clear and comprehensively specilled;
- ﬁrms are allowed to lreely use internal or extemai trading to meet all emission requirements;
- the approval process is kept as simple as possible:
i at the introduction oi the program the baseline emissions tor a source do not exceed actual emissions;


























- baseline emissions are defined in terms of quantities not rates;
- actual emissions are calwlated in a manner not subject to interpretation;
' a market is estdiiished whereby buyers and sellers or permits can easily identify each other:
a banking program is established and banking regulations are designed that encourage external trading;
- the banking is secure - there is no danger that the credits will be devalued.
4.4 United States: Lead In Gasoline
‘ Perhaps the most clear cut example of an economic instrument being successfulty used to reduce emrssrons to a
desrred level is that of the U.S. program to reduce gasoline lead content.
Before 1982, United States gasoline lead limits were enforced on a refinery by refinery basis: each refinery's gasoline
output had to meet an individualized average lead content standard. in 1982. the U.S. EPA promulgated a rule which
permitted refiners to produce gasoline with a lead content h her than their original limit, if they could buy the right to do so
from another refiner who would produce gasoline with a lower ad content.
In earty 1985. a new U.S. EPA rule required that, between earty 1985 and January 1986. gasoline lead content be
reduced from 1.1 to 0.1 grams per gallon, with a midpoint of 0.5 grams per gallon to be achieved in mid-1985. The rule

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 4.6 Wisconsin: Fox River Biological Oxygen Demand
Eaify in 1981. the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources instituted regulations allowing the transfer of 800
(biological oxy engsmand) discharge permits among ten puip and paper mills and four municipalities located along a 22 mile
stretch ol the ox err
in many respects. the choice at a permit trading roach seemed perfectly suited to the chosen settf . Marginal
abatement costs varied widely between dischargers: each ischarger also had a number oi options for producing ncrementai
reductions in BOD discharge. On the basis 01 studies which concluded that biological oxygen demand (800) control costs
could be lowered by 40% l reducing a predicted annual saving of $6.7 million per year), permits were issued to ten pulp and
paper mills and to four mun cipalitles.
The results of this experiment have. however. proved diswpointing. One trade was made in 1981. Since then there
have been no further trades. The unwillingness of dischargers to trade has been attributed both to the design and
administration of the trading structure (permits expire alter live years, dischar e ‘ hts may be sold only upon demonstration
that no additional abatement technology can be installed by the seller. admin trat e wproval of trades is slowi (Hahn and
Hester. 1989 and to the unwillingness of business competitors to give up permits which may be necessary to future















































5.0 AN EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
5.1 Outlining the Approach
The literature on economic instniments commonly uses several standard criteria to evaluate the instruments and
systems of direct regulation which they are intended to complement or replace. These criteria include: their capacrty to meet
environmental objectives, the level and distribution of compliance costs. administrative practicality and compatibility with the
existing institutional framework
it is usually difficult to reach conclusive results as to the instrument(s) of choice from an evaluation in terms of these
criteria Much depends on the specific environmental problems to be addressed and the circumstances within which the
instruments are expected to operate. A feature of the present study is that it is focused on a specific set of contaminants in a
well- identified region for which the environmental objectives are reasonably clear: virtual eiirnination of persistent toxics.
A second and related consideration is that the study is intended to assist in deciding whether and in what way economic
instruments can help in achieving virtual elimination of selected contaminants. Rather than simply list the strengths and
weaknesses of each candidate instrument. an «preach has been developed which shows how the evaluation criteria bear on
the choice of which instrument to use. The next section descrbes a 'decrsion tree' which systematically evaluates the options
through a series of linked questions. Depending on the yes or no answers to the questions. the selection of direct regulation
or any one of a number of economic instruments is indicated.
To be clear, it is not the purpose of the decision tree to show how the selection of a regulatory option. La. 3 of direct
regulation of one of several economic instruments ought to be made. Neither is it the purpose to show how decis s actually
are made. Rather. the decision tree is simply a way to organise the issues and criteria into a framework that is helpful for
com arin the alternative regulatory options. Obviously, the actual selection of an economic instrument cannot be reduced "to
a r ative simple set of questions to which yes or no answers can be en. However. the advantage of the decision tree
approach is that it shows how the various considerations can be ad and. depending on the circumstances, hops
determine the suitdiility of a particular instrument or molt. Also, the decision tree is general enough to be of use in
evaluating the role that economic instruments mm: play in achieving environmental ob‘ s under a very wide rangeof
circumstances only some of which are relevant to specific toxics considered in this stu .
in the next section an explanation is lgig/en of how the decision tree operates. The discussion proceeds along each
branch of the tree in turn. in later waters. main considerations that emerge from the decision tree are used to evaluate
the application of the economic instruments to the virtual elimination of mercury, PCBs and persistent toxics from the pup and
paper industry.
5.2 The Decision Tree
Figure 1 shows the decision tree. it consists of 13 pairs ofquestions (01 to 013) and sets of criteria (C1 to 01:!) upon
which answers to the questions depend. The decision tree is intended to be wplied on a contaminant-by contaminant basis.
This section of the report shouidbe readwthfrequent reference to Figure 1.
D MkaMRM?
The first question to decide is whether virtual elimination is the wopmte regulatory objective for a particular
contaminant.
m1: HMMWI‘MbNm
Within the domain of the Great Lites basin. a contaminant is to be virtually eliminaed if it is a persistent toxic
according to the definition given in section 2.1. Priority for action has been given to the if 'criticai poiiutants.‘ If virtual
elimination applies continue to question 2, otherwise deal with the contuninant under a different framework.
D MZBWMDNMW
The timing over which virtual eliminaion is to be achieved is critical for deciding whether economic instruments (apart





















discharges. swported by a system of monitoring. progecution and fines. financial burdens imposed on sources by




























































    
E
 




           
WW“ 1































   
 
   





   
  



























There 1'5 0'79 Circumstance in which a tax (effluent charge or tradeabie emissions) IS
seit-evrdently intenor to a standard (direct r war/on), This is where the pollutant is so
damaging that an outnght ban on its use is caled ior...Aliemative/y, there is such uncertainty
thatjwzddteCIde it is too risky to use the pollutant, Th/s situation tits a number of ecotOxins and
00 a was.
(Pearce and Turner, 1990: 107)
Crimea WWWWMBEMWW
The pace at which Virtual elimination is to be achieved will be determined largely by the health and environmental risks
whic continued discharge oi a contaminant into the Great Lakes environment is expected to bring. Additional
considerations include the magnitude and impact oi compliance costs and the opportunity tor learning from experience
as virtual elimination is approached. At present. although the use at some substances has been banned in Canada and
the US (eg. Mirex) no contaminants that are in industrial products have been completely banned lrom entering the
Great Lakes. By implication, there is no regulatory requirement in Canada or the United States lor prohibition oi the
discharge oi any persistent toxic into the Great Lakes environment.
In Figure l. the outcome "direct regulation" (with no role ior economic instruments) lollows trom a 'yes' to question 2. A
"no" response calls tor a phased reduction in discharges and the means for achieving this reduction is pursued in
question 3.
0mmMMWNMMMW?
The review in Chapter 3 at economic instruments in practice showed that the use oi economic instmments for achieving
envrronmental objectives. as distinct irom raising revenue, has been limited. Regulatory agencies throughout the wortd
have traditionally relied on direct regulation, usually with economic instruments in a stpponing role or in no role
whatsoever. A crucial question that must be addressed therelore, is whether to rely on direct regulation lor achieving
virtual elimination oi persistent toxics? "
Orlerta3: WWMEMMMNMGIWW
The usual prelerenca lor direct regulation over economic instruments is based on a number at lactors. some oi which
are very relevant to an evaluation ot economic instruments as a means tor achieving virtual elimination oi persistent
toxics. These factors provide criteria tor helping decide whether reliance on direct regulation alone is the best way to
achieve virtual elimination.
amuse!
All parties to regulation: politicians. civil servants. industry. environmental interest groups and the general public are
iamiliar with a re ulatory woadi that sets standards and enloroes them through ovals. prosecutions and lines. it
a certain type behaviour is unwanted, most people think in terms of inlorm n/educatlon programs to secure
voluntary compliance and legislated limits to oblige those responsble to chmge their ways. Apart lrom deposit/reiund
systems tor retumwie bottles. people have a very limited experience with economic instruments as tools at public
policy and probably think that the term reiers only to these deposit/reiund systems and to subsidies.
Despite the tact that in Canada and the United States people are exposed to the decision making power at the market,
the idea oi using economic instruments. such as an etliuent charge or emissions trading. is alien to most peopie and
lacks immediate and obvious and. Moreover, by taking away some at the decision making authority oi those
administrators currently respons tor giving vats under existing 3 stems oi direct re ulation, economic
instruments may be seen as a threat to the very pe without whose support t are unlltely to be mplemented.
For all these reasons, lamillarlty with direct regulation is seen as a reason ior continuing to rely on it let achieving
environmentd obiectlves. Against this, however, is the record at direct regulation which has seldom met the obiectives
set tor it. and the growing interest in various quarters in economic instruments as a way oi promoting the achiewment
oi environmental and economic objectives.
Symbolism






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































WP+50 (August 9. 1991)
 
 Qsdaiotxylhmlli
One congtderation which has traditionally favoured the use of direct regulation is the belief that such regulations bring a
degree of certainty that economic instniments lack. However, for a number of reasons expectations that requrred limits
set DY “9911mm” M" be met have often been frustrated in practice. These include: a lack resources devoted in
monitoring and enforcement, a reluctance to prosecute, unfavourable decisions in the courts. low penalties. and a
concern about the socro-economic consequences of high compliance costs. Nevertheless. the perception that direct
llmgis set bydfegulatlon bn'ng assured results remains and should be considered when a decision about direct regulation
is eing ma 9.
  
it is not only the public that wants to see direct regulation. Such regulations can reduce the uncertainties facmg
dischargers who like to know what is being required of them. At the same time, this desire to know "the rules of the
game" can also make it difficult for the politicians and administrators to change the rules even when new evidence
suggests that Such changes are justified.
Qost Minimization
Perhaps the strongest argument against relyin too much on direct regulation is that it is not cost effective. The
argument that economic instruments are cost 9 ective is directly related to the flexibility of these instruments that was
described above. Under a conventional permrttin System it can easily happen that two sources of the same
contaminant face different marginal (i.e. incrementa mate of reducing discharges. By allowing the source for which
costs are higher to increase its level of dischar e and requiring the other. lower cost source to reduce its level of
discharge from both sources, the same combined evel of discharge can be maintained but at a reduced total cost.
To achieve an economically efficient allocation of discharges through direct regulation requires that the administration
has detailed knowledge of control costs at each source. However, if the sources are allowed to trade permits, the
sources themselves, who only have to know their own costs of control, will determine whether ermit trading is to their
mutual advantage. If it is, the savings in total costs will be realized without intervention by the ministration.
A similar argument can be made in favour of effluent charges. Faced with an effluent charge per unit of emission.
sources can be expected to reduce their emissions as long as it is cheaper to do so than to simply pay the effluent
charge. Providing different sources face the same effluent charge, the will all tend to reduce their emissions to the
point that the incremental costs of doing so are equal to the effuent ergo and therefore equal to each other. This
result will minimize the total costs of reducing the combined emissions from all sources that are subiect to the effluent
charge since no reduction in the total cost of emission reduction could be achieved by transferring emissions from one
source to another.
The degree to which economic instruments will. in practice. reduce the costs of meeting an environmental obiective
depends upon many factors not least of which is the variation in incremental reduction costs among the various sources
subject to control. The greater is the variation in these costs, the greater will be the potential savings from tradeable
permits and effluent charges. in the event that these costs are very similar, there will be little or no advantage in using
an economic instrument to meet an environmental obiective.
.‘LechnoiszaisaLErmss
Although efforts have been made to mate direct regulation “technology forcing' by requiring increasingly high levels of
performance, there remains a concern mm, for the most part, direct regulation actually discourages the development of
new technologies. One agument is that, for contaminants of reatest concern, regulatory agencies require sources to
meet standards at least equal to the best treatment techn y available. Therefore. the development of a new.
expensive technolo by a firm may actuallyopenalize the firm if it is obliged to install it. Since the cost of new
technologies cannot predicted in advance their development, firms have little incentive to invest resources into





















insists on the use of the best available technology since it assures them of a market for new technologies if regulatory



































































































































































































































 Firstly, under direct regulation where iirrns in very different financial situations may be required to incur similar. high
compliance costs. there may be a concern that some plants will be forced to close if virtual elimination is achieved too
mildly and so the reduction schedule is set according to what the highest cost abater can afford. When emissions
trading is allowed such sources can buy cheaper abatement at other, lower cost sources thereby reducing the financial
obstacle to a more rapid wproach to virtual elimination.
Secondly, the traditional reliance on permits, monitoring, inspections, prosecutions, convictions and court imposed
penalties. with each stage subiect to considerable uncertainties and possible delays. hasu‘generaily failed to bring
compliance with environmental objectives at the rate expected. An effluent charge of s icient magnitude or an
emissions trading system based on a declini total loading could greatly increase the incentives for compliance. One
reason is that under direct regulation there is ittle or no incentive to control discharges beyond the permitted level if to
do so adds to costs. With emissions trading or effluent charges there is always a financial gain to be made from further
reductions.
As stated earlier. the choice is not necessarily between direct regulation and economic instruments, only between an
exclusive reliance on direct regulation and other wproaches. As subsequent stages in the decision tree will show,
financial enforcement incentives can be grafted on to a system of direct regulation which underlines the fact that. in
reality. the choice will be between exclusive reliance on direct regulation and some mix of direct regulation and
economic incentives. (Allowing emissions to be traded does very little per se for ensuring compliance and even with an
effluent charge direct sufficiently high to offer a real incentive for reduction. direct regulation w if still be required to deal
with unusual events such as leaks and spills.)
At this point. the decision tree branches either to direct regulation as the on tool for achieving virtual elimination or to
economic instruments to play a maior role in achieving Virtual elimination. ven if it is decided that direct re ulation
should be relied upon as the primary component in a regulatory Egogmm. the decision tree subsequently cons era the
role that financial enforcement incentives could play. On the of r hand. if the arguments in favour of some form of
economic incentive for achievi virtual elimination seem compelling when applied to a specific case. then the selection
of economic instruments at this ranch in the tree should not be seen as irrevocwle. if further analysis of the economic
options reveals that. while promising,they are unsuitable for any of a number of reasons which will soon come to light.
then reversion is still possible. '
To continue, therefore, with the analysis. it is assumed that a negative answer is given to question 3: is. there will not
be exclusive reliance on dired regulation. (Question 12 pursues the direct regulation option assuming that a positive
answer is given to question 3.)
D m4z9IIHhTﬂMUMbOLmW










































an additional unit). Under an effluent char 0, the regulatory agency sets t e price of discharging an additional unrt of
emission and the sources themselves if on their discharges.
in principle the two schemes are symmetrical and can be used to achieve the same results although the distributional
implications may be very different if Ing on what mechanism is used for the initial allocation of the tradeable
emissions and what is done with any funds received by the government.
When a dedslon has been listen to achieve virtual elimination over a period of tlme ills to be expected that a timetable
for achieving virtual elimination wil be established. Such a timetable may be restricted to an enqziolnt by which time
virtual elimination is to be achieved. it may also include milestones. expressed in terms of reducingthe quantity and/or
concentration of discharges. so that progress towards the ultimate goal can be monitored. owever, even this
app‘roach does not require that the discl'iarges be limited directly. This is a matter doout which a decision must be
ma 9.
MtFUWMIITﬂMMNWM
The most important criteria for dedding whether waste emissions should be limited directly (to. at interim. declining
non-zero levels on the way to virtual elimination relate to what is known about a) the emission reduction cost functions
in material and one y inputs in production, d' erent tecl'inologies. differences in the age and condition of equipment.
differences in plant 3 2e and differences in operating efficiency and the damage function .
3 The emission reduction cost function (which is somewhat broader in scope than a control or abatement cost function) is a
quantified relationship between reductions in emissions and costs. The function will be different for each reflectin differences
in material and energy i uts in production, different technologies. differences in the age and condition equipment.
differences in plant size an differences in operating efficiency.













































if the emission reduction cost functions are relatively steep, small variations in the allowable total il.9. from all sourcesi
emissions can have a dramatic effect on the Costs of compliance which will be reflected in the prices of tradeable
permits. An effluent charge has the advantage in this case by avoiding UfdelY high emission reduction costs without
sacrificing much in terms of the resulting level of total emissions.
However. if the damage function displays the existence of critical thresholds above the level of virtual elimination, a
strong case can be made for limiting emissions below these thresholds in the approach towards virtual elimination. For
example. once the concentration of a persistent toxic is reduced below one such threshold some uses of the water may
be considered sale. in this case. considerable benefits could be obtained prior to virtual . ninatlon providin the total
level oi emissrons is reduced below this critical level. Fie onses to an effluent charge can only be estimatet? and may
prove to be insufficient to meet the interim threshold. here may be delays before this is known and it may be
administratively difficult. if not impossible. to raise the effluent charge quickly to secure the desired result.
in contrast, an emissions trading system can be geared directly to the achievement of interim thresholds and can give
somewhat greater assurance that they will be met. It only requires that the total permitted level of emission be reduced
from one threshold level to the next until virtual elimination is achieved. (In most cases such thresholds, if they exist at
all, are more likely to exist in a relationship between ambient concentration and effect rather than quantity or quality of
emissions and effect. This detracts somewhat from this advantage of emissions tradin over effluent chargesi
Furthermore. the market price of the tradeable emissions will reveal useful inforrnatlon on t e costs of compliance as





















indicate that an effluent charge may be more suitable than emissions trading for achieving virtual elimination. Another






















































































































































so lmentary and groundwater sourcesg.













































































































































































































































































































































































































emissions (tons rather than tons per yearl in this market the permits are an exhaustble



























 Tietenberg discusses a cumulative emission permit system in the context of "uniformly mixed acoumulat‘rve pollutants.‘
For pollutants that mix uniionnly location does not matter. if mixing ls not uniform then the scheme may have to be










































year provi ing competition prevails. This result is that as the unused permits diminish over time. t e real price of a
permit will rise at a rate equal to the rate oi interest and the quantity emitted in each year will decline until virtual
elimination is achieved. (Technical change can modify this result.)
CrlarhS:ForDedhgontrUehWBnissimPemls
The apparent simplicity of cumulative emission permits is most obvious when the contaminants mix unilonnly and the
location of the discharges is irrelevant. Whether or not this situation applies depends on mixing patterns and on the
relevant damage functions. in the absence of the necessary information it may be wise to assume that location does
matter and that local as well as regional effects of persisth loxics are ol concern.
Even when a contaminant is persistent and toxic. it seems unlikely that the eftects of discharges on the ecosystem will
be independent oi their timing. Without additional constraints. a trading system does allow for the entire permitted
quantity of a contaminant to be discharged at one time as well as in one place. Unless there is extremely high
confidence in the belief that the tem ral pattern of discharge has no real bearing on the ecosystem effects it would be
unwise to leave decisions about tim ng exclusively to market forces. There is also the possb lit that once all permits
have been used q) pressure will be brought to beer for additional permits to be issued. T is possibility may be























































































To achieve virtual elimination the qua oi discharg'e allowed by aJiermIt would have to decline over time such that a
permit which allows x Kg of discharge this year wi only allow a ischarge of y K next year (y < x). Through this
means. emissions trading could tdte place but eventually virtual elimination woud be achieved according to the
predetermined timetable. One example at such a system is the trade in "emission reduction credits" used in the United






















allowwie emissions equitable and ii) whether any other initial distrbution could be introduced without strong
opposition from existing sources.






















































































be avoided b dlstr'butlng the mantis emissions according to some historical level oi emissions but to do so
introduces a ltional cements not only tout the current relevance of these historical levels of emissions but also about
the accuracy oi the measurements.)






















Despite the possible inequities in ailocatln tradeable emissions according to current permitted or actual emissions. it






































































advantages will take is in cost reductions. However. no source can be assured of a cost reduction if. in addition to the
costs of reducing emissmns. they also have to pay for their initial. re—trade share of the tradeable emissions. The
possibility of imposing a tax on the level of tradeable emissions h by an source to return some of their economic
value to the government may also be difficult to introduce for this reason. i e issue of what the government might do
with the revenues accruing from an auction or a tax on tradeabie emissions is taken up under question it.)
Decisions about the initial allocation of the tradeable permits are inextricably tied to decisions about the level and
allocation of the financial burden that such schemes involve. Whatever decision is made on this matter. and the
decision tree in Fi ure 1 shows two possibilities. itrade based on existl permitted or actual discharge and a permits
auction). the quest on of additional limits to protect local areas must be ad ressed.
W7: anldUnlsmTradeebelupoeedIoPmtedLodNea?
Additional limits to protect local areas have been imposed with respect to air emissions. where trading systems have
been most extensively used. These limits are designed to ensure that ambient concentration standards are met and/or
that ambient concentration levels do not increase. There may well be a concern that ambient concentrations should be
limited even as virtual elimination is approached. One of the risks of trading systems is that. in the absence of specral
measures to protect local environments. ambient concentrations of persistent toxlcs in these environments may rise
unacceptably.
Crlerh7: FwDediliglenlsonTmhsSfuldbeWbPrMLodNeu
if there is evidence that shows a relationship between ambient concentrations leg. in sediment or in benthic
communities) and effects on species h her up the food chain that is charaderized by thresholds. then there are good
grounds for restricting trades such that t ese critical ambient concentrations are not exceeded. Even in the absence of
such evidence. it may be deemed grudent to prevent an accumulation of tradedile emissions at specific locations which
are believed to be at risk if am lent concentrations rise. Proximity to sensitive ecological areas leg. wetlands.
spawning areas. breeding grounds. municipal water empties) might be reason enough to regulate trades such that
ambient concentrations (or combined discharges) do not rise.
This concludes the discussion oi the portion of the decision tree that deals speciﬁcally with emissions trading. (The
possibility of combining financial enforcement incentives with emissions trading or direct r ulation is idien up under
question 13.) Previously. a 'no' in response to question 4 (should quantities be limited direc ?) would have lead to the
selection of effluent charges (or some other charges system) for achieving virtual elimination once it was decided that
exclusive reliance on direct regulation was unwise. There are several questions and criteria for evaluating the role that
charges might beginning with question 8.
came MmEﬂthfmebeWmErm-‘I
in principle. an effluent charge can be used to achieve virtual elimination. This can be accomplished by increasing the
level of the charge to induce greater and greater reductions in the quantity and/or concentration of emissions. An
announcement that the effluent charge will e raised periodically. say every year. until virtual elimination is achieved
may hasten the process since the expectation of an ever increasing effluent charge will justify a greater level of
expenditures to reduce emissions than an effluent charge which may or may not be raised in the future.
Crier“: FaDedlqlmEtht-pmuwaedmm
if virtual elimination is the god but the precise path towards it is unimportant (or there is insufficient iniorrnation to know
what the path should be) then an effluent charge that increases over time may be referable to emissions trading. First.
the administrative requirements of an effluent char 9 may be more modest. ( or the reasons given in response to
question 7. the local environment may only be a equately protected if trades are regulated.) Second. an effluent
charge is not wedtened if only a few sources. which may not compete effectiveiy in an emissions trading market. are
involved. Sources large or smal. many or few. all have to pay the charge end will all have an economic incentive to
reduce their discharges.
Third. an effluent charge wil generate revenues. Question 9 examines whether this is an advantage or not. it is


























































































































































 The iinai consideration to be considered is whether or not emissions can be monitored reliably enough to support an
eiiluent charge. Monitoring is also required ior direct re uiation but it may be less demanding to determine ii a source
is in compliance with a speciiied level at emission than t e precise level oi emission. Furthermore. it sell-monitonng is
used there would be an increased incentive ior under reporting than with direct regulation since every unit reported
would add to a source's costs.
Despite these complications, an eiiluent charge has the potential to be an extremely powerlul tool in the arsenal oi
instruments aimed at virtual elimination. What to do with the revenues is the next question it charges are to be
considered iurther.
A negative answer to this question does not necessarily entail a reiection oi all systems oi charges. One possibility is a
charge on speciiic materials to discourage their use. This possibilit is addressed in question it. For now. an
aiiirmative answer is assumed and the issue oi what. it anything, to o with the possible revenues from an eiiluent
charge is considered.
C] mam-immumm
The success oi an eiiluent charge to achieve virtual elimination oi persistent toxics will be marked by the diswpearance
oi any substantial revenues. However. belore that point is reached the potential revenues irorn a system oi eiiluent
charges could be considerable. Hence. the interest oi some governments in "green taxes."
The danger in using an eiiluent charge to raise revenues is that the achievement ol virtual elimination will coniiict with a
government’s revenue requirements and this might mdte it diiilcuit or even impossble to continually raise the charge
until all toxic emissions are eliminated.
An efﬂuent charge can be revenue neutral (i.e. generate no additional revenues ior government) it a commitment is
made to adjust other tax rates downwards so that total government revenues remain unchangz‘d. in pradice this may
be diiticuit to do because it requires adiustments to the rates irorn what they would otherwise e been in the absence
oi an efﬂuent charge and this is a matter oi speculation not tact. .
One approach to revenue neutrality that should be analyzed very careluiiy before implementation is to reimburse the
sources that pay the eiiluent c e thro h some ionn oi subsidy to hep deiray the costs oi reducing emissions. The
danger with t is approach is thatt e says may undermine rather than reinlorce the very incentives ior action that an
eiiluent charge is sipposed to olier.
Crlulat Whammth
Revenue neutrality is important it revenue generation threatens to compromise the eiiectiveness oi an eiiluent charge.
It may also be a heblu feature in persuading sources to accept an eiiluent charge because total revenues paid to
government will not be allected. (Moniehal sources may be problematic in this regard.)





















eiiective in inducing some reduction in disdiarges thou other instruments will be needed to go a the way to virtual
elimination.
ll revenue neutrality is reiected a dedsion must be made about what to do with the iunds generated which is the topic at
question to.
D thmmhMbMPw-u?
The revenues inom an eiiluent charge (or irom auctioned emission " hts') can be tied to speciiic government
expenditures or go into the consolidated iund as one oi many categories 0 revenue out at which government iunds its
programs.
cilarhlo: ForDedrltglmeeﬂedePIw-u
Opinion polls indicate that 'green taxes' may be the only ty oi new taxes that the public will ay without much
resistance. However. the same polls also indicate that the pu ic wants to know how the iunds will e spent. Ii these
polls show a widely held view that will endure then revenues may have to be tied to speciiic programs it there is to be




























































































































































prospect of their funding drying up as virtual elimination is achieved and the revenue from the effluent charge
approaches zero.
The final step in the decision tree goes back to question to which asked if a charge should be put on the effluent.
Previous questions examined the implications of a positive response to this question. Question 13 examines those of a
negative response.
Cl QiesﬁmltzgnMaNmmaugebethdepedhm?
it effluent monitoring is too unreliable or too expensive to support an effluent charge. or their is a risk that a charge will
result in intermedia transfers. a reasonable alternative can be a charge on a product that is used as an input to
production providing that it is closely correlated with the emission oi the unwanted persistent lexic. (For example. a
charge imposed on the use oi mercury or P083 will discourage their use and encourage a search for aftemativesi
Altematively. a depcsmrefund system on products that can cause a release of persistent toxics (e.g. batteries) can be
useful for ensuring reuse. recycling and proper disposal.
The problem with charges on inputs is that they provide very little incentive for improved management of a material
once it has been purchased (except to make internal recovery and reuse mar inaily more attractivel In particular. input
charges do not directly penalize the action that is to be deterred which is t discharge of persistent toxics into the
environment. Therefore. their effectiveness is thought to be less than that oi an effluent charge though their range of
application may be greater. Non—point sources are seldom amenmle to an effluent charge but they can sometimes be
effectively discouraged with a charge on specific products. A charge on toxic chemicals used in agriculture is but one
example.
Product charges can also be imposed at the oint of sale to final consumers. Ideally. such a charge would be related to
the quantity of persistent toxics discharg at all stages oi production. consumption and die sal of the product.
However. unless an extremely detailed sc
production process. a product charge will generally be too remotely related to the emission oi persistent toxics to be




v The main criteria for deciding this question are whether effluent monitoring is problematic and whether there is a close
I S
edule of charges is used. which differentiates not only y product but also by
correlation between the quant of a product purchased (either as an input or final consumption) and the quantity of a
persistent toxic released. if a lgh proportion of a persistent toxic entering the Great Lutes environment comes from
non-point sources then a charge on specific products could be useful in achieving virtual elimination. Also. some
non-point sources such as agricultural runoff. may be responsive to product charges even when effluent charges are
impractical.
Similar issues relating to revenue neutral as were discussed under an effluent charge also aply to a charge on
specific products. One way of imposing suc a charge that avoids revenue is through a deposit/refund system.
A deposit/refund system imposed on products which contain persistent toxics can hep ensure that the materials are
recovered and reused and then ultlrnately d 386 of in a arattvzl‘zmsafe manner by physical and chemical
treatment. incineration or in a secure landflﬂ. hese measures d hep nate persistent toxics from entering the
environment.
The main Criterion for assessing the solubility of a deposit/refund system for persistent toxics is whether the requisite
infrastnicture exists or can be created. Care must be taken to ensure that the various steps in the system can be
undertaken safety without risking unwanted and possbly large discharges of the contaminants into the env ronment.
This concludes the section of the decision tree that deals with economic incentives except in the loan of financial
enforcement incentives. These are a possibility in coniunctlon with direct regulation or tradeable emission permits.
Question 12 reverts to a further consideration of direct regulation assuming that the conditions for economic
instruments, particularly emissions trading and effluent charges are not met.
CI WIZMM“WTWNW
Regulations can be promulgated that llrnlt the allowed quantity that a source may discharge into the Great Lakes
environment. Such regulations leave it to the individual sources to determine how they will meet the limits imposed on
them. This is the approach usually followed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Another mproaoh is to have
regulations which specify those processes (including raw materials and produa characteristics) and/or control
technologies that are allowed or prohibited.
The first approach allows a greater range of choice to the sources sub to regulation which lowers overall compliance





















later proves inadequate. Under these circumstances. sources may request and be granted an exemption from a
non-compliance penalty on the grounds that these actions received government approval.
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adoption of technologies which simply transfer toxics to other media.
MIZTOMMPWMWTWMNW


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































     



































































TABLE 5.IA Summary of Evaluation Framework (Questions 1 to 3. continued)
    
QUESTION DIRECT REGULATION ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT ANSWER

















(Here. subsidy would not
encourage Increased
production}
11 Stakeholders are iamiliar with increasing interest in using
USE DIRECT direct regulation. Growing economic Instruments
REGULATION sense that direct regulation is
EXCLUSIVELY? not achieving goals. Leaves
more authority with current
decision-makers.
Gives appearance at iinn Gives appearance oi putting
action environment up lor sale.
Arguable, lust putting an
explicit price on what is
already being sold or given
away, implicitly
May require more extensive Monitoring requirements
monitoring. ii there is: should be similar. except
-a need to demonstrate stat- In case of noted
istically the likelihood oi exceptions
a continuing violation over
a period oi time
-a need to monitor trades as
well as discharges
-technology-based regulations
can be monitored simply by
ensuring Installation at a
piece at equipment
Nonpoint sources are
difﬁcult to monitor; may
’ require regulatory or use
charges
Administrative requirements are Administrative requirements
well understood. More dltilcult are uncertain. Easier It
to regulate cost’etiectively goal is to regulate cost
effectively
Negotiations allow tor consld- Allow decentralized decision-
erable ilexblllty In lmplement- making about how to achieve
atlon. but may result in reduction targets
considerable delay
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 TABLE 5.1A Summary of Evaluation Framework (Questions 1 to 3, continued)
       
thresholds are likely to be ambient; setting
trademle permits with an eye to ambient
needs is more diiilcuit
will be achieved. The question becomes: is
it more costly to be uncertain mout the
















:1 Appears to give certainty oi
(mused) result. but track record does
USE DIRECT not bear this out. Appears to















difﬁcult to administer to gain inal abatement costs.
detailed knowledge oi control Sources have incentive to
costs minimize costs to same
marginal level. it marginal .
abatement watement costs are
similar for all Iirms. much
oi the advantage is lost.
(Still retain advantage oi















technology/technique may so are encouraged (but in
increase doaternent costs. Dis- both cases, standards are set









be achieved more quickly as
all need not move at pace oi
highest cost tater. Eiiiuent
charge is a bigger incentive
to act than lines lor non-
compliance .





















4. iii cost lundions are steep. eiiiuent In princple, the two schemes are symetrical
LMT charge gives better control over reduction i
W charges

















ABATBBIT uncertain. may be better to iix total practice, there will be a significant
COST discharge level with a permit. However, level oi uncertainty as to the result that























summary of Evaluation Framework (Questions 4 to 73, continued)
 
QUESTION DISCUSSION CONCLUSION
4. (Catered) Market only won<s it there are enough sources
LMTT to ensure competltlon in the market ior permits
DlSCHARGES May be potential to use permits to exclude new
BY OUANTTTY entrants. Some emitters may not be in a pos-
OR MAXNUM ition to trade (nonpolnt oi past dumping sitesl
ABATBAENT
COST?
5. in the absence oi evidence to the contrary, it (This creates a signiiicant burden on the
TRADE: BY is salest to assume that timing and location use oi any economic instrument. Any
GMDUAL RED- oi discharges does matter. Concern that all reason to believe that cumulative permit





AT 0465 AS AN
EXHAUSTABUE
RESOURCE?
ii Should economic value oi permit go to the class (Could auction the permrtsl
TRADE BASE oi polluters? And, in particular, to the
As CURRBiT biggest polluters? May discourage new entrants
PEMTTED on too. It may be impossible to do anything else
CURRENT ACTUAL due to opposition from existing sources. Could
DiSCHARGE? impose a tax on the permits to recover some oi
the value





a ll the precise path toward virtual elimination is
EFFLUENT unimportant (or lndetermlndalel, a gradually in-
CHARGES: creasing eiiluent chage may be preierable. Wlil
USE“Bil? require less administration. Market size won't
matter. The more a charge has to be reilned to
account ior varialons in local or ambient eiiects
or tlrne or yea. etc., the harder it will be to
implement. Requiring dischargers to pay a tee
over and above abatement costs involves a redis-
tributlon oi income which will be resisted.
Monitoring requirements may be higher





   
wruso (August 9, 1991)
Continued
33
 TABLE 5.18 Summary oi Evaluation Framework (Questions 4 to 13. continued)
 
QUESTION DISCUSSION CONCLUSION
10. Revenues required by a given program may and (Tax could be instituted to raise revenues
EFFLUENT up differing from revenues received. Revenue notwithstanding virtual elimination by




If. Spread net too widely. Don‘t locus on dlsc’n- (Does cost of further monitoring exceed
USE arge. Mates sense only where monitoring cost of casting not too wide?)
NON-REFWDARE discharge ls difficult, eg. nonpoint. It a
PMDUCT high proportion ol sources are nonpoint. may
CHANGES? be useiul. Deposit/refund option would avoid
putting burden on nondischarger and be non-
revenue raising. FIe: deposit/refund: How
easy will It be to set up the necessary
infrastructure?
1?. 9mm: Less range oi choice lirer leads
SPECIFY to higher compliance costs. Still needs to
PMCESS ensure proper operation, maintenance of
COMM equipment.
TECHOOLOGY? AWE: ll monitoring is difficult; it
sources have less expertise than government
in selecting tedinologles; may need to mandate
spill avoidance
13. Examples are performance bonds and emission
USE FNANCW. charges on excess quantities. Excess charge
NCBITIVES? is more closely tied to level of exceedence
   

















































At one time. the discharge oi mercury to the Great Lakes basin was almost entirely irom chlor-alkali plants. These
plants were lirequently located near pulp and paper mills. due to those mills' need for bleaching chemicals. Brine was
eiectrolyzed to mercury cells to produce c iorine as well as sodium hydroxide and hydrogen.
Today. neariy all oi the old chlor-aikali plants have either closed or they have been convened to non-mercury cell
processes and the law plants that continue to use the old process have reduced their mercury emissions markedly. However.
mercury levels in iish are still a matter of concern in many areas oi the Great Lakes basin (lntemational Joint Commission
1989} and iurther reductions in discharges of mercury to the basin are being sought.
in the early 19705, reducing merCUry discharges seemed a strai htiorward matter. In Canada. ior instance. chlor-aikali
plants were required to limit their mercury discharges to a certain quant per tonne oi chlorine production capacity. For other
industries. mercury dischages became a matter to be considered in the grantingeoi discharge permits. The lirst section oi this
chapter will indicate that a ieving iurther reductions in mercury discharges will more complex.
The mercury which is now enterin the Great Lakes basin comes irom diverse sources the relative importance of which
is pooriy understood. Contaminated s ments. the i acy oi past discharges. are certainly a prominent source. Deposition
irom the air is also important. apparently accounting or about three quarters oi depositions resulting irom ongoing human
activity. The main source oi emissions oi mercury to the air is its evaporation irom a wide variety oi mercu containing
iinished products such as batteries. paints. electrical switches. dental sippiles. control instruments and rIIghts. The
incineration oi products in which mercury has been used. in particular batteries. is also a signiilcant source 01 emissions. The
combustion oi coal also releases substantial quantities oi mercury to the air. Mercury discharged diredly to water appears to
be enterin the basin mainly through sewage treatment plants. The sources oi the mercury entering sewage treatment plants
are not we I known.
The control oi the discharge oi mercury. considered in the second section at this chwter. can be achieved In a number
oi ways. Many local memory contamination problems can probably be cleared ip by remediation oi sediments in a iew
locations u particulariy near the sites oi the old chlor-aliaii plants. The non-essential use oi mercu in products such as paint
and batteries is currently virtually unregulated. These uses could be reduced and ultimateiy en entirely. incinerators and
coal-tired power plants could install more eiiective pollution control devices to reduce mercury as well as other metal
emissions.
6.1 Sources oi Mercury
Estimates oi the quantity oi mercury discharges into the Great Lakes irom industry (direct discharges). sewage
treatment lame. and atmospheric deposition are summarized in Tables 6.1 (all ldtesl to 6.7 ior each lake and the t.
Lawrence iverl. It is important to realize that these data are iar irom complete and are not cons red to be very accurate.
Nevertheless. the overall picture that emerges is believed to be reasondaie and Is oi some use in assessing the role that
economic instniments could play in achieving virtual elimination oi mercury discharged into the Great Luise.
TABLE 6.1 Sources at Mercury Discharges to the Great Lites Basin (Total)
Tonnes/year KIlograms/day Kilograms/day Percent 9
SOURCE Dolan 1985 Dolan 1985 Dolan 1988 Dolan 19
iNDUSTRiAL DIRECT 0 05 0%
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT 1 23 12%
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION 8.08 76%
TRIBUTARIES 1 27 12%
TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 10.63 100%
Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET datwase, US EPA; TRI Toxic Release inventory. U.S. EPA












































































































































































signiiicance oi the sources ior which data are available remains in question.
Tables 6.2 to 6.7 suggest that the individual sources oi mercury are widely scattered. This is true 01 the sewage
treatment plants and the atmospheric sources. (Though it should be noted that in Late Erie, where iniormaticn ior a large
number 01 sewage treatment plants is available. six plants account ior most oi the mercury discharges.) Glass et al. (1990)
indicate that the incineration oi municipal reiuse is a signiiicant source oi the atmospheric deposition oi mercury in the Great
Lakesé incinerators in the U.S. and ten in Ontario. Five U.S. and one Canadian incinerator in the r ion have capacities over
18.000 kg/hr oi waste. The U.S. National Emission Standard lor Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAG33) aliows 3.200 g/day oi
mercury to be emitted to air b a sewage slu e incinerator. European domestic garba e has been iound to contain an
average 3-403 oi Hg/‘tonne, ut 50% oi whch is accounted ior by used batteries ( eimann 1986). Some individual
countries. so as Denmark, however, separate dry-cell batteries irom household wastes through a collection system operated
through the retail outlets where the batteries are sold.
TABLE 6.2 Sources oi Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes Basin (Lute Superior)













lNDUSTRlAL DiRECT/lNDlRECT 0.00 0%
Michigan Callahan Mining 0.0001
White Pine C 0.0079
Minnesota U.S. Steel - . 0.0008
-Ontan‘o James River Marathon) 0.0004
TE -Corunna 0.0001
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT N/A N/A
Minnesota Western Lake Stperior 0.400
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSiTiON 2.64 78%
TRIBUTARiES 0.74 22%






TOTAL FOR AVAiLABLE DATA 3.38 100%
Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET datwase. U.S. EPA; TRi Toxic Release inventory. U.S. EPA
6.1.1 Soidede























This iindlng was discussed with a swim oiiicial at the Ontario Ministry oi the Environment who believed it to be correct.


























































































































mercury emissmns tor the US.7 seem far too low. What emerges from Table 6.8 is that anthropogenic sources oi air
emissions of mercury (650 lonneS/year) exceed emissions irom natural sources (500 tonnes/year). The use oi linished goods
I352 tonnesxyear. most of Which comes irom aim and electrical equrpment), coal tired power stations I113 tonnes/year).
municipal and sewage sludge incinerators l 8 and 36 tonnes/year. respectively) account lor almost 90% oi the total
anthropogenic sources. Although similar data do not exist lust tor the Great Lakes basin it is likely that a similar pattern 01
emission sources exrsts there too.
TABLE 6.3 Sources 01 Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes Basin (Lake Michigan)
TonneSIyear Kilogram/day Kilogram/day Percenta 9
SOURCE Dolan 1990 STORET STORET 1988 Dolan 19
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT 0.00 0.0251 0%
Michigan Hitachi Ma netic 0.0018
Wisconsin Bergstrom aper 0.0153
J.I. Case 0.0059
Waupaca Foundry 0.0021
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT 0.40 23%
Wisconsin Neenah Menasha 0.6400
Racine 1.1000




TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 1.74 100%
Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET datmase, US. EPA; TRI Toxic Release inventory, US. EPA
TABLE 6.4 Sources 01 Mercury Discharges to the Great Lures Basin (Lake Huron)
Tonnes/ ear Kilo rams/day Kilogram/day Percent
SOURCE Dolan 1 ST RET STORET 1988 Dolan 1
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT N/A N/A
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT N/A N/A








TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 2.36 100%
Data Sources: Dolan 1990; STORET datwase. US. EPA; TRI Toxic Release inventory, US. EPA
7 Similar data was obtained ior Ontario irom Jacques 11987) but arenot considered very reliable. The estimated totals oi live








 TABLE 6.5 Sources 01 Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes (Lake Erie) ~

















INDUSTRIAL DIRECT/iNDiRECT 0.00 0%
-indiana Gn‘dcraﬂ 0.0001
Stanscrew 0.0001
0010 BP OiI-Oregon 0.3113
LCP Chemical-Ammonia 0.0075
Summit! Comm. Fish 0.0017
-Pennsy1vania Gunnieon Bros. Tannery 0.0000
Maiinckrodt-Ene (to STP) 0.3113
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANT 0.80 36%























Geauga 00.. Madariane 0.0200
Kent 0.0000
Ldre Co., Mentor 0.0100
Law 00.. Madison 0.0000
Linwood 0.0100
Lima 0.0200
Lomin. East Side 0.1100
Lucas Co. 0.0100
Medina Co. $01 0.0000







N.E. Ohio. Region #1 0.0000
N.E. Ohio, Region #2 0.0900
NE Ohio. Region #3 0.1100
N.E. Ohio. R ion #4 0.0400
orwak 0.0100
0dr Harbor 0.0000 ‘
Continued I























TABLE 6.5 Sources of Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes (Lake Ens. continued)
Tonnesgear Kilo rams/day Kilogram/day Percenta e Kilogram/day
SOURCE DoIan 1 85 ST BET 1985 STORET 1988 Man 19 TRI 1988
Ohio. continued












Summit 00., #1 0.0100
Summit 00., #2 0.0000







ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION 1.20 54%
TRIBUTARIES 0.24 11%




TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 2.24 100%
Data Sources: DoIan 1990; STORET (Idiom, U.S. EPA; TRI ToxIc Retenee Inventory. U.S. EPA
TABLE 6.6 Sources at Mercury DIscharges to the Great Lakes (Lake Ontario)
Tonnes/year KI s/dey KIIogreme/dey Percentgg Kilogram/day
SOURCE DoIan 1985 ST RET1985 STORET 1988 DoIan 1 TRI 1988
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT 0.03 3%
-New York Abex 0.0000
Dwont 0.0908 0.0000
Eastman Kodak 0.0000 0.0000
Hooker 0.0029 0.0030
New York Stae Electric 6 Gas
- MIIIIten 6.8. 0.0016 0.0253
- Somerset 6.8. 0.0861
Rochester Gas & Electnc
- (Indirect) 0.3709
- (DIrect) 0.0002
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TABLE 6.6 Sources of Mercury Discharges to the Great Lakes (Lake Ontario. continued)
Tonnes/year Kilogram/day Kilogram/day Percent Ki rams/day
SOURCE DoIan 1985 STORET 1985 STORET 1988 Doian 133; Tim988
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT, continued
New York Goulds Pumps 0.0004
AIIled Chemical 0.0009
Oneida Limited 0.0011
SCA Chemical SVC 0.0007
Clark Specialty 0.3796
Olin - Niagara Falls 0.0037
Olin - N.F. {to STP) 0.0299
Occidental - N.F. 0.0062
Occidental - N.F. (to STP) 0.0012
LCP Chem - Solva 0.1370










New York Amherst 0.0100 0.0100
Niagara Falls 0.0700 0.0400





wwstor WS PH 0.0100







TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 0.89 100%
Data Sources: Doian 1990; STORET dwase. U.S. EPA; TRI Toxic Release Inventory, U.S. EPA
TABLE 6.7 Sources of Mercury Discharges to the Great Lute: Basin (St. Lawrence River)
Tonnes ear K rams/day K runs/day Percent
SOURCE Dolanl ST RETI985 8% ET1988 Dolan1
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT N/A
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Marco Mining and Smeiting <1 1983
Fossil uel Combustion Utility coal 113 1985
Industrial coal 18 1985
Commercial/residential coal 1 1985
Utility oil 1 1985
Industrial oil 3 1985
Commercial/residential oil 3 1985
Smelting Copper 41 1980
Lead 5 1980
Zinc 5 1980
incinerators Sewage sludge 36 1980
Municipal waste 68 1986
Battery Manufacture 1 1982
Mercury Recovery Retorts <1 1982
Mercury Chlor-Alkali Plants 3 1983
Use of Finished Goods 352 1980
TOTAL ANTHROPOGENIC SOURCES 650
TOTAL ALL SOURCES 1,150
Source: Bloxam 1991
One important feature of air emissions of mercury is that ditierent forms of mercury have very different deposition rates.
In particular. elemental mercury may stay in the air for many months. so that distant. even global sources can be as im hi
to local sources in determining how much mercury is deposited into the Great Lates from the air. Accordi to xom
(personal communication) the importance of extra-regional reductions in mercury emissions is indicated by a h proportion
of elemental mercury releases. Twle 6.9 shows that all of the merwry released from the use of finish products is
elemental. At the other end oi the spectrum. only 25% ct mercury from munlcpal solid waste falls into this category.














SOURCE ELEMENTAL BIVALENT PARTICULATE
HG (gaseous) HG (gaseous) HG
Finished Products 100% 0% 0%
Power Generation/industrial Coal Burning 75 20 5
Non-ier'rous Smeiling 90 10 0
Chlor-Akall Production 45 45 10




































































































6.3 Appllcablllty of Economic Instruments
This section considers the mplication of economic instruments to achieve the virtual elimination of mercu enterin the
Great Lakes based on the information given above. The analysis follows broadly the analytical framework of hapter but
concentrates on the issues most pertinent to mercury.
it is clear that mercury is an apgrggnate candidate for virtual elimination in that it is a persistent toxic and has been
identified as a critical pollutant by the L 08. While efforts to reduce the discharge of mercury into the environment have a
long history in Canada and the U.S., no generalized prohibition has been introduced. A phased reduction of mercury
discharged into the Great Lakes reflects an attempt to find a balance between protection of the environment and the benefits
obtained from the use of mercury in modern economies.
There are two considerations which affect any attempts through direct regulation or economic incentives to achieve
virtual elimination of mercury discharge into the Great Lakes:
- the available data for mercury on uses (especially in Canada), sources. quantity discharged and quantity entering the
Great Lakes is very partial and unreliable:
' much of the mercury entering the Great Lakes is transported by air from sources outside the Great Lakes basin.
Any effective approach to reducing mercury in the Great Lakes must begin with a better reciation of where the
mercury is coming from than the lnlorrnation currently available allows. Furthermore. any 3 me to achieve vrrtual
elimination oi mercury discharged into the Great Lakes will have to be applied to jurisdictions that are outside of the Great
Lakes basin. Conceivably, national programs in Canada and the US. might be required just to solve a regional problem.
However. reductions in mercury discharges anywhere in the two countries might well bring benefits that would justify programs
that are continental in scope.
Although recise uantitative information is unavailable. it is clear from the tabl9s presented earlier in this Chapter that
mercury is use in a wi e range of industrial and agricultural sectors. Much of the mercury ends tp in finished products en
route to the environment unless the roducts are recycled and the mercury recovered, or they are disposed of in secure
landfills. This suggests that there is l eiy to be very substantial differences in the costs of reducing the mercury emanating
from these various sources. Also. it is possible that there are good prospects for substitutions to be made and for new
technologies that can be developed to reduce the use of mercury and its discharge into the environment. As ex alned in
Chapter 5. these considerations: large differences in discharge reduction costs andI“Liossbilities for tec nological
developments. provide important grounds for using economic instruments to achieve virtual ell atlon.
all MTraﬂIgormMCfi-p?
The main criterion suggested in Chapter 5 for choosing between these two types of economic instruments concerned
the shapes of the discharge reduction cost functions and the damage functions. Based on the limited lnlorrnation available.
and given the general downward trend in mercury use suggested by Table 6.11, there is no compelling reason to select
emissions trading over an effluent charge. or vice versa. Both instruments can hep secure a continuing reduction in mercury
discharges.























Lakes. Even if such a scheme was restriaed at the outset to the larger sources (coal fired power stations. smelting.











































effluent charge on mercury emissions is irnpiemented.)






































































































































































































The previous discussion of emissions tradl and effluent charges was predicated on an assum ion that steps can and























should be considered is to apply economic instruments to the use oi mercury. Two 0 tions are: tradeable permits or product
charges to reduce the use of mercury in manufactured products. Table 6.10 shows t at a relatively small number of product
categories account for most oi the mercury consumption in the US. with batteries alone. accounting for mout one third oi the
total. A System oi tradedale input permits similar to that used to eliminate lead in gasoline could also be effective in this case
Similarly. a charge on the use oi mercury would also stimulate a reduction in its use.
Finally, the possibility of a oslt/refund System for some gas oi products containing mercury should be considered.
in Toronto. for example. a limited nfrastructure for retumlng us batteries for proper disposal is already in place and is
operated entirely on a voluntary basis. it would have to be substantially expanded and regulated to cope with a
comprehensive de sit/refund system just for batteries. If the system was extended to other products the complexity of the
infrastructure requ red could greatly increase.
6.3.3mEdamW
Effective direct regulation of mercury discharges to achieve virtual elimination is handicmped by the same data
problems as the use of emissions trading and effluent charges. However. if these problems are solved and the advantages of
these economic instruments found not to be compelling, there may still be a role for financial enforcement incentives to
increase the likelihood that r ulated sources will, in fact. comply, with the increasingly stringent discharge limits that will be
required to achieve virtual ellmnation.
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7.0 ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS AND VIRTUAL
ELIMINATION OF DISCHARGES OF PCBs
Polychionnated biphenyls iPCBs) are odourless. colourless organic chemical compounds synthesized from the reaction
oi bipnenyi with anhydrous chlorine. Characterized by a high degree oi stability and resistance to heat and pressure. PCBs
make excellent lubricants and hydraulic iiuids lor industnai processes such as aluminum die casti where h' h pressures are
exerted. in addition. PCBs have been lound useiul as insulating fluids in transiormers and C8386 013, 83 DastICIZBFB Where
iieme resistance is requrred. as constituents oi ink and paints. as hardeners in metallurgical processes and even as dust
suppressants.
It has been estimated that by the late 19603, when PCB use reached its highest levels. about 61% oi US. use was in
'closed' electrical systems. 13% was used in "nominally ciosed' processes (largely hydraulic iiuids) and 26% oi use was in
'open' systems (ior instance. ink) (Lamay 1990).
Since that time, growing concern over the health shoots of long term exposure to PCBs has lead to increasing
restriction upon their production and use. By the late 19703 the manuiacture. im nation and resale oi PCBs were banned in
Canada and the United States iexe tions were and are available ior narrow deiined research uses). The storage and
disposal oi PCBs is also strictly contro led in both countnes. However, the use d PCBs in materials or equpment where they
are already in service continues to be permitted. in Ontario alone. as oi 1989, there were 7,800 tonnes oi high-level PCBs
and 13.300 tonnes oi low level PCBs in service. and 11,000 tonnes oi PCBs in storage (Dilon 1989). Equlvlent estimates tor
the United States have not been iound.
The uantities oi PCBs entenn the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem have iailen signiiicantiy over the past decade.
Levels oi P 83 iound in Great Lakes i and aquatic mammals have also been decreasing. But these declines wpear to be
levelling oil at undeslrmly h levels. Fish in all oi the Great Lakes continue to be iound with PCB levels exceeding the
Great Lures Water Quality greement obiectlve (0.1 mg/kgé (international Joint Commission) Greu Lakes Water Oudty
Board 1989). Concem over the continuing presence 0 P Bs throughout the Lates has led regulators to seek lurther
reductions in their discharge.
in deciding how to reduce discharges oi P083 to the Great Ldtes basin, regulators first have to identity where the PCBs
are coming irom. The answer to this question is iar trorn clear. PCBs are slightly heavier that waer. md so East discharges
have left large quantities oi PCBs deposited on river and 18m bottoms. About 50% oi PCBs now entering the rest Lures are
robwiy releases lrom those sediments. A iurther 30% are probdnty the Ldies by means oi drborne deposition.
olatiiizatlon oi iiuids iedted lrom transiormers. electrical power generation lndustrld fuel combustion are believed to be
among the main sourrns oi emissions oi PCBs to the air. The final 20% are airtuted to direct it es and unknown
sources. Probably less than 5% at dlsdierges are directly irom point source disdierges to water. although is low number is
at least in part attrtutwie to very low levels oi monitoring. T e next section oi this chmter provides lurther detail on the
rather ragged state oi knowledge oi PCB discharges.
7.1 Sources at PCBs
Estimates oi the quantity oi PCBs discharged into the Great Lakes irom industry (deed disch ), sewage treament
plants. and atmospheric deposition 8e sunmutzed in Tales 7.1 to 7.7. The due are not con ered complete or very
accurate but they 0 give some idea at the various sources.
Table 7.1 shows thl. emordng to Ddlt (1985). atmospheric deposition oi PCBs accounts ior about 60% oi the total.





















account tor the rerhﬁiihg 72%.
TABLE 7.1 Sources at PCBs to the Gred Laces (Tot!)

















































Sources: Dolan 1985; MC 1988
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ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION 0.12 0.545 80% 90%
TRIBUTARIES 0.03 20%
-Ontario LIttIe Pic 0.029
Pic 0.048
OTHER 0.061 10%
TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 0.15 0.606 100% 100%
Data Sources: Doian 1985; IJC 1988
TABLE 7.3 Sources 01 PCBs to the Great Lakes (Lake Michigan)

















Wisconsin Badger Die Cast 0.0000
Ber srtom Pmer 0.0024




























Sources: DoIan 1985;1JC 1988.

































INDUSTRIAL DIRECT 0.01 2%
















































Data Sources: Doian 1985; IJC 1988




































TABLE 7.5 Sources of PCBs to the Great Lakes (Lake En‘el
TonneS/year Tonnes/year Kilogram/day Percenta 9 Percentage
SOURCE Dolan 1985 IJC 1988 DoIan 1985 Dolan 19 5 IJC 1988
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT 0.00 0%
Michigan Ford WIxom 0.0001
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS N/A N/A
ATMOSPHERIC DEPOSITION 0 12 0.328 57% 13%
TRIBUTARIES 0.09 43%





TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 0.21 2.520 100% 100%
Data Sources: Dolan 1985; IJC 1988
TABLE 7.6 Sources 01 PCBs to the Great Lakes (Lake OntarIo)
Tonnes/year Toma/gear Kilogram/day Percenta 9 Percentage
SOURCE DoIan 1985 IJC 1 DoIan 1985 Dolan 19 5 IJC 1988 -
INDUSTRIAL DIRECT N/A N/A
SEWAGE TREATMENT PLANTS N/A N/A









TOTAL FOR AVAILABLE DATA 0.29 2.540 100% 100%
Data Sources: DoIan 1985; IJC 1988;
Note: OTHER attributed but non-momma to Ilsted sources.
TABLE 7.7 Sources 01 PCBs to the Great Ldtes (St. Lawrence)

























The importance oi tributary loadings oi P085 is Suggested by some estimates oi PCB pathways into Lakes Michigan that
are summarized in Taste 7.8.
TABLE 7.8 PCB Pathways to Lake Michigan
Pathways Kg/yeer Percent
Tributaries (include sediment releases and direct dumping) 1.150 75.0
Atmospheric 380 24.7
Direct Discharges to Lake (industry & STPs) 5 0.3
TOTAL 1.535 100.0
Source: National Wildliie Federation and Canadian Institute ior Environmental Law and Policy (1991).
Acc0rdlng to Lamay (1990), 76.4% oi all tributary loadings to Lake Michigan is "sediment-bound" and so considered to be
deposited to the Lake irom the sediments as o osed to irom current discharge sources. No individual discharger to Lake
Michigan is releasing more than 2 kg/year. A iu her bredtdown 01 Lake Michigan tributary loadings is given in Table 7.9.
TABLE 7.9 Lake Michigan Tributary Loads
Pathways Kg/year Percent
Fox 520 38.0
Grand Calumet 191 14.0
Kalamazoo 1 14 8.4
Waukegan 20 1 .5
TOTAL ' 845 61 .2“/.'
.' Note that Shebo gan Harbor, whose sediments are heavily contaminated with P083. has been omitted. "because oi clean-




However. it is still 3
in Ontario and Eastern N. America
TABLE 7.10» Air Emissions oi PCBs in Ontario and Eastern North America in 1985 (kg/yr)
osition accounts for a smaller proportion oi total PCB: entering the Great Lakes than tor mercury.
ientiy important to examine its origins. Tables 7.10 to 7.12 gives estimates oi air emissions oi PCBs
Eastern
Emission Category Ontario North America
Stationary Fuel Combustion 6.9 446
Solid Waste incineration 1.2 42
Open Sources 36.9 517
TOTAL 45.0 1.005
Source: Ortech 1990



































































































Sewage Sludge incineration 3.6
Industrial Waste incineration 6.9
Commercial/institutional Waste inc. 3.0











Data for 1989 iron the US. EPA Toxic Release inventory Data (TFil) shows that total air emission releases from "Lake
Michi an Slates'. (Western Michigan. Wisconsin. indiana and llilnols) totalled 8.56 it yr. TFti includes only manutacturin
iaciiites that produce.Tgraces: or use over 10.000 lbs oi one oi the 332 TFii listed emlcais or over 50.000 be oi all TR
chemicals combined. ese data are presented In Table 7.13.
Given the estimated air emissions oi 350 kg/yr (Lamay 1990) these point source loadings in the TFil account ior under
3% oi atmospheric loadings.
Lamay cites an estimate by Murphy et ai (1985) that the contribution of MSW plants. due to the lack ot restriction on
burning oi materials containing small quantities 01 P063 (such as carboniess copy paper. capacitors on ﬂuorescent light
ballasts. starting cwacitors on reirlgerator and washing machine motors is .25 kg/yr per stadr. Lamay (1990). without
knowing the actual number oi incinerators In the region. estimates total MS emissions a about 120 k Iyr with 13-117 kg/yr
deposited to Late Michigan. Sewage sludge incinerators are estimated to emit 50 kg/yr oi which 0- 2.5 kg/yr enter Lake
Michigan.
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lllinois SCA Chemical Services 1.09
Album. Inc. .09
AMCE International .1 8
Northwestern Waste Ener y 540
Wisconsin City oi Sheboygan Department oi Public W0 3 .54
ntercommunity Incinerator Dist. .63
City oi Waukasha .18
lndiana East Chicago Municipal .18
8th Adhesrve .27
TOTAL 8.56
Source: TRl; Lamay 1990
7.2 The Control of PCB Discharges
















































scale. Removal and treatment oi subsurface contamination may not be techn ly leasbie.
Prevention rather than treatment is likely to be the most cost-eiiective woach ior reducing PCBs entering the Great
Lakes. This requires a reduction in the use at PCBs and the elimination oi stocks in storage.






















economic instruments might play in achieving the virtual elimination oi CBs entering the Great Lures.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in view oi the fact that PCBs
are no longer permitted to be manufactured.
imported or resold anywhere
in Canada or the
United States twlth minor exceptions lor researchl there is no need to rely on economic instruments to provide incentives to
develop less harmful substitutes or alternative production processes. Likewise. there is little opportunity for economic
instruments to capitalize on differences in abatement costs for P083 given that strict controls on emissrons are already In
existence The problem seems to be those at monitoring and enforcement which would not be lessened by the introduction of
tradeable permrts or effluent charges.
Given the current state of knowledge it seems that the greatest reductions in discharges can probably be achieved by
cleaning up the more severely contaminated Great Lakes basin sediments. However. such clean ups are currently quite
expensrve. Accelerating the removal of PCBs irom electrical egu' merit through regulation. supported by lines or financral
enlorcement incentives. would also reduce future emissions signi cantly providing the P083 so removed are disposed of
effectively. The exemption allowing wastes containing under 50 pans per million of P085 to be exempted from strict PCB
disposal controls. found in both in Canadian and US. aw. could be removed Other reductions could be achieved by tighter
control of direct discharges to water and discharges to sewa e treatment plants. strict quality control at PCB destruction
facilities and other currently permitted 'ciosed' system uses of 083 could be restricted or eliminated. Actions such as these
can be best be implemented through direct regulation.
in summary. even if better data on sources were available. the prospects for using economic instruments to achieve the
virtual elimination oi PCBs in to the Great Lakes, except in a supporting role of ﬁnancial enlorcement incentives. seems limited.

























8.0 AN ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE PULP AND
PAPER INDUSTRY IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN
V
The pulp and paper industry has historically been characterized by slow. steady market growth and limited technological
innovation. Recently. however. the industry has been showing signs of moving into a period of rapid technological change.
The “globalization” of pulp and paper markets. involvin free trade between Canada and the United States as well as
the emer ence of low cost third world reducers is bringing eavy pressure on the industry to become more efficient. The
advance age and relatively small sc 9 of Ontario‘s pulp and paper facilities make them particularly vulnerable to these
pressures.
’ The need to reduce acute and persistent toxic emissions from pulp and paper mills will require this industry to make
significant process changes. in particular, new chiorine~free bleaching technologies may have to be adopted. New air and
water pollution control equrpment will also have to be purchased.
Growing pressure from governments and consumers to increase the recycled fibre content of paper products is
increasing the need for mills which can reuse waste papers. in combination with demand for reduction in the over all use of
packaging materials. the demand for recycling may also reduce the market for pulp and pater products made with virgin fibres.
While the need to adapt to new circumstances will create financial risks. it will also present innovative pulp and paper
producers with great opportunities. Currently many companies. particularly those operating in Canada. are suffering the
effects of a recession. but on the whole the industry is believed to be generally sound and healthy (Pulp and Paper. January
1991; US. Department of Commerce 1990; Value Line. Janua 1991). Companies are believed to be in a position to make
the investments that will be necessary to survive in a global. ecorzigicaliy sustainable market.
8.1 Pulp and Paper industry Products
Pulp. paper and board making constitute the most important sector of the North American forest products industry. in
terms of tonnes of product as well as dollar value. The sector also serves the lumber and plywood manufacturing sectors as a
maniet for by-products of their production.
For most purposes. pulping processes can be categorized as either chemical or mechanical. although the two
processes are sometimes used in combination. The levels of use of these methods of pulping in the United States. Canada
and the rest of the world can be seen in Tables 8.1. 8.2 and 8.3. respectively.
Mechanical pulping involves fuming wood into fibre by means of grinding or beating. Between 85 and 95% of the wood
furnished to a mechanical process is actually used in the product. As a result of retaining most of the wood content, individual
tibres retain a high ilgnln content and are relatively stiff. The resulting pup has relatively few contact points between fibres
and so produces paper with a relatively low strength.
Chemical puping can produce a relatively strong product from virtually any sort of wood. Lignin and some
hemiceiluloses are removed from the wood by chemicaidpuping, producing more fiexbie and better bonding fibres. Typical
kratt pulp uses about 45 to 55% of the wood fumishe to the process. Sottwoods produce stronger kratt pup than do
hardwoods.
Mechanical pub is characterized b its opacity. ink absorbtivity. resilience and stiffness. These characteristics make
mechanical pup desirable as a source newsprint (typically containing 80 to 100% mechanical pu i. printing and writing
pa rs (including supercalendered m azine paper). lightweight coated paters (typically containing 0 to 60% mechanical
pug, and folding caton boards (norm 30 to 50% mechanical pup).
Semlchemlcal pup is used mainly for corrugating medium. Semlchemlcai pop is desirable for this use due to its ability
to resist compression and crushing.
Recycled fibre has most commonly been used as a furnish for padraging papers and boards. if is also used in sanitary
and creped fpapers. The use of recycled furnish for making newsprint is rqoidly increasing. Some use is now also being made
of recycled ibre in printing papers.
Chemical pulp is distinguished by its length and strength and is used as a reinforcement fibre in nearly all 'wer and
board grades. Softwood chemical pub is stronger than hardwood pup. Hardwood chemical pu . on the other h is slightly






































































Sulphite. bleached 1.269 1.554 1.565 1.433 1.433
Su hite. unbleached 171 (incl. in bleached 189 189













































































































































































































































































































































































































































Canada Paper and Paperboard Production and Capacity (continued)
(Thousands of Short Tons)
1987 1989 1990 1990 1991
test.) (max. pract. capacrty)
PAPER
Newsprint 10.653 10.667 10.400 12.161 12.744
Printing 8 Writing) 2927 3.515 4,076 4,453 4696
Kralt Packaging apers 625 579 567 576 594
Tissue 8. Specialty 503 537 535 722 752
Total Paper 14,708 15.298 15,578 17,912 18,786
PAPERBOARD
Containerboard 2.154 2.143 2.244 2.483 2.507
Boxboard 818 803 783 1.005 1.073
Total Paperboard 2.972 2.946 3.027 3.488 3.580
GRAND TOTAL 43,008 44,209 43,876 51,371 53.656
Source: LockwoodsPost (1990)
TABLE 8.3 Global Share 01 Production. Papermaking Flaw Materials. 1985
Raw Material Share (°/.)
Chemical pulp. softwood 32
Chemical pulp, hardwood 13
Mechanical pulps (mainly softwood) 16
Semichemical pulps (mainly hardwoods) 4
Recycled libre 22
Chemicals. tillers, synthetic fixes 7
Pulps irom non-woody plants 6
TOTAL 100%
Source: Ebellng 1987
Table 8.4 indicates the levels 01 global consumption 01 various sorts at over and paperboard products. Tailes 8.1 and
8.2 may also be reterred to for levels 01 production oi those products within the United States and Canada
TABLE 8.4 Total Global Consumption oi Paper and Board, 1985
Consumption
Paper Board Grand (million tons/year)
Printing and Writing 49
New rint 28
Soft issue Paper 11
Sad Paper 6
Total Paper (55%) 105
Linerboard 30
Corrugating Medium (lluting) _ 15




























 8.2 The Economic Significance of the Pulp and Paper Industry
8210”






















provincial production and employment. Nevertheless. changes in demand ior its oducts still have widespread implications
tor the Ontario economy. In particular. communities in Northwestern Ontario and a rip the shore at Lake Superior are heavily
dependent upon pulp and paper production
Employment

































































600 were employed in asphalt rooting manuiacture (Coke 1988).























57.000 jobs are indirectly stimulated by the Ontario Paper and Allied Industries (Coke 1988).








































































































Allied industries (Coke 1988).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Michi an, during 1987, the production oi Paper and Allied Products directly created 20,600 )obs (3% of state total)
produced US, 17 billion dollars in value added (3% of state total) and shipped US$36 billion worth of products (2.5% oi
state total) (US. Department oi Commerce 1990).
in WlSCOHISln. '0 1987. the Paper and Allied Products Industry employed 43.000 people (8% oi state total). produced
U 8.939 billion in value-added (12% 01 state total) and shipped products with a value oi US$88 billion (13% of 81818 total)
(U 8, Department oi Commerce 1990).
TABLE 85 Direct Economic Contribution to the Area of the Undertakln tor the Ontario Class
Envrronmental Assessment oi Timber Management. Made by the Forest. ining and Primary Metals.
Tourism and Fur Industries, 1986
VALUE OF SALES VALUE OF SALES
VALUE OF SALES PER FULL-TlME
EMPLOYMENT OR EXPENDITURES EQUIVALENT
(person-years) (SC-millions) (SC-0003)
Forest industry Logging 7.470 985 132
Forestry Servrces 3,865 60 16
Wood industry 9.500 1,215 128
Paper 8 Allied industries 15.045 2.430 162
- Total 35,880 4,690 131
Mining and Primary Metals Mines 15.745 2.475 157
Primary Metals 13.335 1.665 125
Total 29.080 4, i 40 142
Tourism Total 27,100 1 ,310 48
Fur industry Total 700 14 20
Source: Peat Marwidr 1989
In Ohio, durl 1987. the production oi the Paper and Allied Products Industry employed 30.000 people (3% oi state
total). produced US. 1.9 billion in value-added (3% ol state total) and sh'pped products with a value 01 US$44 billion (3% oi
state total) (US. Department 01 Commerce 1990).
In New York. during 1987, the oduction oi Paper and Allied Products employed 40.000 rsons (3% 01 state total).
created US$22 billion in value-a (3% 01 state total) and produced shipments worth U.S.$4. billion dollars (3% oi state
total) (US. Department of Commerce 1990).
While the Michigan pub and pater indust is located entirely within the Great Lutes basin, on a part 01 Wisconsin,
Ohio and New York's pub and paper it acllities are within that area. in llinois. lndiana and innesota. only a small
portion at pulp and paper industry 1 are located in the Great Ldres basin.
Table 8.6 indicates the total levels 01 pulp, paper and Paperboard production in the region which includes the Great
Lakes basin, as well as giving an indication ot the importance 0 the region to the U3. pup and purer industry as a whole.
TABLE 8.6 Pwer. Pwerboard and Woodpulp Productlon, North Central Region
(Thousands 01 Short one, 1987)
Paper Pwerboard Pup









































































































































































































sectors oi the industry
TABLE 8.7 Capital Cost 01 Pulp and Paper Facilities. 1984 (1984 US dollars)
Facility Size Cost











Bleached irraft mill 1.000 414.500.000
Bleached sultlte 1.000 407,100,000























































































































































































































































































































































































the pulp and paper industry may also be oi slg mce.














































































































































































significant portion oi environmental control costs.






































Market pulp production is also characterised by an oligopollstic structure. Within Canada 28 market kratt pulp
producing mills are controlled by 'roughly 20' com antes (McCubbin 1990). Across North America. levels 01 concentration
Similar to those in the newsprint sector are found: T 9 top five companies in the industry control 39% 01 market share and the
top ten companies control 59% (Pulp and Paper. October 1990).
Capital costs 01 building an optimally sized new kratt pulp mill. which would produce 1200 tonnes of pulp per day. are In
the area 01 031.4 billion (McCubbin 1990). This is a signiﬁcant barrier to entry. Environmental control costs may also
contribute to the dittiCUlty ol entry. in addition. a mill must have access to a very large area of forest. over a long period of
time. in Northern Ontario. McCubbin estimates that an optimally sized pulp mill would require access to about 63,000 acres 01
forest every year.
- Printing and Writing Papers
The printing and writing papers sector is lar less homogeneous than the newsprint and pulp sectors. producing a wide
variety of product types. However. market niches within this larger sector tend to be dominated by small numbers 01
companies. For instance. in the North American market lor coated tree-sheet paper (used in magazines. catalogues.
commercial printin and some books) three com antes hold 53% oi the market share. the largest live hold 66% and the top
ten companies hot 99% (Pulp and Paper, July 1 90).
U 8. production in this sector is tar larger than Canada's. Trade between Canada and the United States in this sector is
relatively small. although this may be attributable to the past existence at significant tariti barriers.
- Other Sectors
Like the printing and writing sector. the rest 01 the pulp and paper indust shows a significant level of diversity while at
the same time small numbers at companies dominate the production 01 individua products (Taste 8.8).
TABLE 8.8 Market Share in Selected U.S. Pub and Paper Markets
TOP FIVE TOP TEN TOTAL MARKET
















Kralt Paper Stone Contalner 23.1% 69.0% 96.0% 2,745
Bleached Paperboard lntemational Pmer 19.7% 65.4% 92.4% 4,838
Kratt Linerboard Stone Contalner 14.0% 49.7% 78.4% 20.339



























































































Each 01 these sectors tends to be dominated by a small number at producers.
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 TABLE 8,9 The 20 Largest North American Paper Companies. 1989
(millions of US Dollars)
PAPER AND ALLIED RANK BY



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Thunder Bay Abrtibi-Price Fine Papers Thunder Bay Groundwood 125 P Total, 442 W line and
Harbour coated papers
Thunder Bay Abitbi Price, Ft-Wiiliam Thunder Bay gagndwood 21;: P Total, 383 W newsprint
1
Thunder Bay Abitibi-Prioe, Thunder Bay Thunder Bay Groundwood 320 P Total, 442 W newsprint
Suiphlte 120























































































































































P . Primary; S - Secondary; tld - tonnes/day



























































Green Bay Green Bay Packaging Fox River
service paper, 7 ud
Semi-Chemical 220 P: Closed Corrugatlng medium.
























































































































































(Subsidiary at Riverside Paper)
Combined Locks Appleton Papers Fox River



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE 8.11 Pulp, Paper and Paperboard Mills in the Great Lakes tcontinued)
RECEIVING




Sault Ste. Mane. ON St. Marys Groundwood 220 Total. 350 t/d specialty
St Marys Paper River Groundwood
Espanoia. ON EB. Eddy Spanish River Kralt 1,040 P. S. 02 Total. 900 t/d bleached kralt
Forest Products 120 Ud specialy, 20 t/d line
Sturgeon Falls, ON Macmillan- French River NSSC 200 124 km to Lake Huron
Bioedel via Lake Nipisslng. 200 Ud
Mechanical 110 co atlng medium
I 10 d hardboard
Cheboygan. Ml Proctor and Gamble Cheboygan River Just southeast of Straights
oi Mackinac
Paper Products
Alpena. Ml Abitibi Thunder Bay River West side at late
Alpena, MI Fletcher Paper Thunder Bay River
LAKE 81E BASH
Ohio maW
Port Huron. Ml Port Huron Pwer Black River into St. Clair River; over 70 miles to Lake Erie
Paimyn‘a. Mi Simplex Industries River Raisin South oi Detroit; over 40 miles inland
Ggpsum. OH US. Gypsum Lake Erie Near Sandusky
C agrin Falls. OH Chase Bay Chagrin River Eastern edge oi Cleveland
RECEIVING PROD.
LOCATION AND MILL WATER MILL TYPE lt/d) TREATMENT NOTES
LAKEMAM BASH
Orllio
Thorold Beaver Wood Fbre Twelve MI. Creek (Pmemoard) Produce 273 W pwerboard
from purchased waste pwer






















































































































P a Primary; 8 - Secondary; t/d - tonnes/day; Continued
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Deteriet St. Regis P or









Newton Falls Newton Falls
Potsdam Potsdam Pwer
Norfolr Simplicity Pattern
from waste paper & board
Black River Over 70 mi. upstream ol Watertown
Moose River Just upstream of Lyons Falls
Bladr Filver About 30 miles upstream of lake
Beaver River Flows into Black River about 15 mi. upstream of Detenet
Bladt Riover At river mouth
Salmon River Southeast comer of lake
Oswego River About 10-15 miles upstream of Oswegho and lake














River paper, 200 W paperboard ‘
Oswegatchie River Over 50 miles upstream of St. Lawrence in at Ogdensburg
Oswegatchie Fllver Over 30 miles upstream ol Gouvemour
Raquette River About 15 miles upstream through Messlna’
Raquette Fliver About 10 miles upstream at Norfolk
P - Primary; 8 - Secondary; t/d - tonnes/day;
While the pulp and pmer industry already wpears to be let




















































decline and as environmental costs 90 w, these smaller operations will be vulnerdue.



















































































































it should be noted that. the size and concentration of the pulp and paper industry may prove advantageous to the
industry if it is forced into large capital expenditures. if producers are able to influence market prices. the costs of
environmental protection measures are relatively more likely to be passed on to paper and board consumers rather than being
absorbed entirely by producers.
‘ Ownership of Forests
in Ontario forest land used in timberdproduction is owned almost entirely by the ovincial government. Allocation of
timber rights is normally non-competitive an involves long term supply arrangements. gs province deals with a number of
large purchasers who do not seem strongly motivated to compete with one another. The high levels of cwitaf invested in
production facilities Creates strong incentives to bid only for cutting rights on nearby lands.
The fees paid to the government for timber cutting rights, known as stumpage. have historically been too low to cover
provincial forest management costs. According to Atkin (1988). the Ontario government lost 03139 million or 054.79 per
cubic meter of timber arvested in the province during the fiscal year 1986-8 . Stum age revenues equalled C385 million
while forest management expenditures equalled C3224 million. Stumpage fees chargedpto pup mill owners in Ontario varied
between 031.04 and $4.55 at that time. s
The government has been criticized for not monitonng harvesting activities more closely (Atkin 1988). Ontario is heavily
reliant upon information provided by the forest industry on actual harvesting practices. inspection of and quality control over
reforestation efforts has also been insufficient to revent a significant level of tree crop failure. However. Ontario does appear
to have adequate forest supplies to meet current evels of growth in the flare needs of the pth and paler industry iAtkin 1988).
Private ownership of forest land plays a much more si nificant role in the United States than in Canada. Originally, all
of the forest land was publicly owned in the US. but over i a years ownership shifted to private ownership in many areas.
Since about World War 1 the are of forest land in the US. has roughly stwifized and large shifts in the future are not expected.
iClawson 1979)
8.4 Pulp and Paper Market Trends
Pu and pwer mariiets will have overcqiacity for several years in all but some coated r and uncoated free sheet
grades. its total US. industry capacity is expected tgq/grow at a compound annual rate of 2.9 over the next three years.
Broducf consumption is ex ed to grow by about 0 per year over the next five years Value Line 1991 and US.
apartment of Commerce 1 1). Overall prices are expected to be restrained by recent and co nulng increases in capacity.
The share that Ontario producers will fate of any market expansion will be shaded by fluctuations in the price of the Canadian
dollar.
' Pulp
High inventories. increasing cmdty Including significantI“growth in low cost South American pulp production.
decreasing operating rates (percentage of meaty actually used) a sipping prices characterize the current state of the pulp
production business.
Chemical pulps sales are also increasingly being cut into by sales of mechanical pups. New developments in the
production of mechanical pups. also known as 'alphabet pups" because of the confusing array of acronyms used to describe
the various pulpingprocesses (CTMP, chemi~thermomechanlcalepuping; TMP. thermomechanicai pggalngé FtMP, refiner
mechanical pulping; and others). have increased their quality and w l as the cost effectiveness of their pr uc n.
Secondary fibres will also be used increasingly. The relatively low costs of secondary and mechanical pup fibre will
create continuing pressure to keep prices low.
Pulp shipments are expected to increase b about 1% in 1991 and about 2% per year overthe next five years. Demand
for high quality bleached pub, in particular the orthem Bleached Softwood Kraft produced in Ontario. should be strong due
to growing demand for high grades of printing and writing paper.
we+51 (August 2. 1991) s 64
 
  
Employment levels in the sector are expected to decline siightiy or stay constant.





























































































































































with little increase loreseen in newspaper uses.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































oi proiit levels which characterizes the industry could be reduced.
Current pup and p
operations are not easily a


















































































































TABLE 8.14 1986 Newsprint Production Costs per Metric Tonne
UNITED
































































031 assumed = US$0.85 SK4.78
' includes purchased kratt pulp
Source: Anderson 1988
Note: if the Canadian dollar was worth 80 cents US. as in 1986. the equivalent
cost of US. production would be 3449. At a Canadian dollar worth 70 cents
US, costs would be about equal.
ITABLE 8.15 1986 Kraft Pulp Production Costs per Metric Tonne
Eastern Eastern Interior US. South Sweden
Canada Canada 8.0. (Softwood) (Softwood)
(Hardwood) (Softwood) (Softwood) (03) (03) .
Wood Costs 03150 03206 03146 03134 03360
Energy 35 30 38 34 17
Chemicals 47 55 51 42 40
Labour 58 62 61 53 58
Other Materials 45 45 52 48 42
Mill Cost 335 398 348 312 517
Delivery 44 44 so 59 33
Total Delivered Cost 379 442 428 370 551
Canadian Dollar - US$0.85 - SK4.78. ll 03- U.S.3.80. U.S. cost - 03394.
Source: Andersen (1988)
TABLE 8.16 Commodity Prices (US. 3 per Metric Tonne)
1986 1988 1990
Newsprint 3545 3650 685
Market Pub (Bleached
Softwood Northern Kraft) 450 725 800
Groundwood Printing
Paper (directory) 735 850
Printin and Writing
Paper ?bond) 725 925
Sources: Andersen (1988) and Pup and Paper various issues
Profit levels in the pub and paler industry have historically been low relative to other manufacturing industries. Given
the level of risk involved in the industry. this is also an important influence on levels oi investment in the industry.
in the immediate future. industry profit leveis will be particularly low. Over the rest of 1991 many companies are
expected to show low profits or losses. A return to more normal profit levels is expeded in 1992 and 1993 as slack created by
recently created overcqiacity is taken w by a steady increase in demand (Value Line 1991).




























































































next two years. This is 21.1% less than spending plans ma e at the end oi 1989. Relatively deeper cuts to Canadian
investment plans are attributed to wedxness in markets ior Canada‘s two most important products, newsprint and market pulp,
as well as the high value oi the Canadian dollar.
These proposed capital ex nditures are broken down as iollows (see also, Tables 8.14 and 8.15). Startups oi new






















1991, 031.4 billion in 1992 and 051.0 billion ior 1993 and beyond. This is a reversal irom strong increases in investment in











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Power plant improvements will cost (1.3.51.1 billion (down 225%) over the 1990-92 period in (he Untied States. Lower
energy costs are seen as the reason for declining spending in this area. The purchase oi co eneratec power irom pnvate
producers has been a Stargicam factor in keep") power costs low. in Canada. energy productgon investment over the same
penod will total 03559 mi n. 01 which (3151 miﬁlon will be spent in Ontario.
TABLE 8.17 US, and East North Central Region Capital Expenditures ior 1990-92+, By Type ot Facility (in 0.8.3000)
East North Central Total US.
Production Wood/Fibre 11.900 (4%) 284.624 (100%)
Related Expenditures Pulplng 255.941 (4%) 6165.478 (100%)
New Machines 875.000 (19%) 4.670314 (100%)
Machine Modiiicatlon 416.666 (17%) 2451.789 (100%)
Energy 174.250 (17%) 1.053.542 (100%)
Miscellaneou3/Piant 129.233 (25%) 512.727 (100%)
Total 1.862.990 (12%) 15.138.474 (100%)
Environmental Spending Water 109.905 (10%) 1.055.489 (100%)
Air 20.135 (3%) 758.350 (100%)
Solid Waste 7.785 (11%) 74.131 (100%)
Total 137.825 (7%) 1,887,970 (100%)
Grand Total 2.000.815 (12%) 17.026.444 (100%)
Source: Pulp and Paper (January 1991)
TABLE 8.18 Ontario Reported Capital Expenditures tor 1990-92+. By Type oi Facility (in C3000)
Ontario Canada
Production-Related Wood/Fibre 12.100 (4% 301.775 100%)
Expenditures Pulping 775.829 (17% 4,471,525 100%)
New Machines 245.000 (19%) 1.320.200 (100%)
Machine Modliication 205.530 )28% 724.561 (100%)
Energy 151.250 27% 559.061 (100%)
Miscellaneous/Plant 1.500 (1%) 252.241 (100%)
Total 1.391.209 (18%) 7.629.363 (100%)
Environmental Spending Water 119.601 6%) 1.893.684 (100%)
Air 16.020 3%) 561.830 100%
Solid Waste 510 1%) 67.835 100%
Total 136.131 5%) 1.527.340 (100%)
Grand Total 1.527.340 (15%) 10,152,712 (100%)
Source: Pulp and Pmer (January 1991)
' Trends in Mill Modernization
The age oi North American and. in particular, Canadian newsprint machines has already been noted in Table 8.11.























iuture. priority will be placed on increasing the scale oi production iacllities as well as on modemlzing production equipment to
make more eiiiclent use oi wood 32mins. Mills will also emphasize the production of higher value grades oi paper. the use oi


























































































































































































































use. as was required for earlier mechanical grades.
Mechanical mills are also more amenable to automation, producing lower labour Costs. and they are better able to meet























with chemical pulping liar ely because more fibre is used and less is released as effluent). Already mechanical pulp is often













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Printing and Writing Pmers
Only a small lncreasa in the use oi wastepaper is seen ior supercalendered or lightweight coated papers. The demand
for high brighiness and 900d Printability qualities currently makes the incorporation oi waste papers into these grades difficult.
Advertisers and other users continue to demand higher quality standards lrom these papers.
opportunities lor the sale oi recycled papers in this sector are for listing paper. envelope paper. paper for 'a small.
environmentally conscrous part ol the business papers market. largely lor public authOrities' (Uutela 1987).
However, the pure potential for recycling oi pnntin and writing paper sis high. According to the Canadian Pulp and
Paper Association. 37% oi the solid waste stream in No America consists ol these high iibre quality papers. A signiiicant
upgrade ol collection of these papers. in particular from oiilce waste streams, could provrde the lumish necessary to produce
a high quality recycled wntlng or printing paper.
~ Tissue
The use oi wastepaper is already high in the manufacture of tissue grades. In luture. waste paper is expected to be
used across a wider range oi tissue grades and the overall use oi secondary iibres in tissue-makln is expected to increase
signriicantly. As a result. many virgin ibre based tissue mills are expected to be required to invest in sinking plants.
- Linerboard and Fluting
Kraft liner is expected to include a higher proportion oi old corrugated containers as more waste material becomes
available. The number ol grades oi iinerboard may also increase to accommodate the various types and qualities ol wastes
which will become available.
- Cartonboards
Recycled libre is already heavily used in cartonboard production. Growing interest in waste grade loldlng cartonboard
ma lead to the development ol new waste-based grades. At the same time, the use at virgin libre is actually increasing at the
hig -end oi the cartonboard market. due to a demand lor brighter wpearance and improved periormance characteristics, A
growing market lor liquid packaging boards also iavours virgin ilbre. Generally. lood packaging legislation currently inhbits
the use ol recycled fibre lor lood padtaging.
~ Wastepaper Business
A growing demand lor waste paper content is encoUraglng s tiers to secure supplies oi waste paper. This is
improving wastepwer business prospects as well as creating iurther mand lor waste papercollection. An increase in
sorting at source will also improve waste paperquality and value. The long term pr ct ls lor tar greater price stability.
partlculariy as mills try to lock in supplies at wastepaper. In the short term. until adequate mill emotty is available. increasing
numbers ol waste separation and recycling programs may produce an oversrpply of some grades at paper.
The export oi old wastepaper lrom U.S.A to Canada is expected to provide new opportunities. High quality old
corrugated cardboard and deinking grades at waste pwer may also be imported to North America to help meet demand.
- Equpment and Chemical Scppliers
Waste aper deinklng is expected to increase signiiicantly worldwide. Much oi the growth will be at US. and Canadian
newsprint mils. As a result. demand lor delnklng chemicals is lorecast to grow by 8 to 0 percent per year. Fibre cleaning











































































































































The pulp and paper industry discharges a wide range oi toxic substances to the environment.
Most prominent among
these discharges
are the class 01 substances known as organochlorines.
Normally measured
as adsorbabie or anic halide
iAOX), chlorinated organics include large numbers oi known toxins as well as a wide range 01 poorly understood su stances.
01 the organochiorines, two highly toxic dioxin and iuran cogeners 2.3.7.8- tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin i2.3.7.8- TCDDZ
and 2.3.78 tetrachlorodibenzoiuran (2.3.7.8-TCDFi have been singled out by the intemationat Joint Commission as 'Criticai
pollutants in the Great Lakes basin.
This Chapter iocuses on the possibilities oi using economic instruments to virtually
eliminate the discharge oi those two substances and AOX in general.
The critical substances list oi the NC is intended to be representative oi classes at pollutants and sources oi pollution in
the Great Lakes basin. in this case. the presence of 2.3.7.8- TCDD/TCDF is associated with the presence oi other persistent
toxins iTabie 9.1). Emissions oi dioxins and iurans as well as organochion‘nes in general are associated only with those mills
at which chlorine is used to bleach pulps. Norrnaliy these are krait mills, although chlorine is also used to brighten suilite and
other pulps.
The number oi miiis using 31 niiicant quantities oi chlorine in the Great Lakes basin is relatively small (Table 9 2i.
Notably. with the exception ot two m is in Thunder Bay. each 01 these mills discharges to a different area oi the Lakes and no
two ml is are known to impact on any one particular area.
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2.4.5- Trichlorotoiuene 35 .15 ND .01
Camphene 34 5.36 ND 3.08
Mercury 33 .09 ND .68
Hexachiombenzene 30 .15 ND .01
Pentachiorobenzene 23 .09 ND ND
1.2.4.5- Tetrachlorobenzene 20 .02 ND .01
Total Hexa-7- Dioxins 19 .02 ND .18
Total Penta- Furans 19 .04 ND .29
Total Tetra- Dioxins 19 .03 ND .07
1.2.3.4- Tetrachlorobenzene 15 .02 ND ND
Total PCB 13 .03 ND ND
Fiuoranthene 1 1 .42 ND .40
Pentachiorophenoi 1 1 .17 .18 .20
Total Penta~ Dioxins 11 .00 ND .04
1.2.3.5- Tetrachlorobenzene 9 .03 ND .01
Pyrene 9 .25 ND ND
Total Hexa-6- Furan 9 .01 ND .08
Total Octa- Furan 7 .01 ND .05
Total Hexav6- Dioxin 7 .01 ND .07
Continued
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Source: Ontarlo Mlnlstry ol the Envlronmenl 1991
TABLE 9.2 Chlodne Using M1113 In lhe Great Lakes Basin
2.3.7.8 2.3,7,8 Total T0181
























































































2.3.7.8 2.17.8 Total Total






























































































ND'- Not detected, but Ontario detection level
' 1 ng/L is approximately equal to 1 ppt (part per trillion)
Sources: MlSA H991), NCASl (1990)
1 IL is mproximately equal to 1 ppb (part per billion
1 ugx. is wproximately equal to 1 ppm (part per million
it should be noted that the pup and pan industry persistent toxlc emissions problem goes beyond the 2.3.7.8- dioxin
and turan cogeners. Other dioxin and iuran oogeners are also significant health risks (Table 9.3). Levels oi AOX and some
other toxic substances remain signiﬁcant even where dioxins have been virtually eliminated. (See, ior instance, E.B. Eddy, in
_ Table 9.1)
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The substitution of chionne dioxide lor elemental chlorine In the bleaching process produces si niﬁcant reductions in
organochlonne effluents. in particular dioxins and furans. while maintaining brightness levels. The EB. ddy mill at Espanola
Ontano has increased chlorine dioxide substitution from 10 to 50% at its 975 tonne kraft mill after determining that si niiicant
reductions in organochionne and dioxin and furan production would result. Resulting brightness is unchanged (8 +l and
paper strength actually increased.
TABLE 9.4 Reductions in AOX and Dioxins and Furans from Chlorine Dioxide
Substitution at EB. Eddy. Espanola. Ontario
Chlorine Dioxtde AOX Ikg/tonnel AOX (kg/tonne) 2.3,7,8- 2.3.7.8‘
substitution level Untreated Effluent Treated Eftluent TCDDippt) TC DFlpptI
10% 3.42 1 39 2.2-3.6 7 1-110
28% -- u 1.8 6.4
48% 2.31 1.15 ND ND-6.2
52% -- -- ND ND
58% 1.38 0.68 ND ND
ND . Below detection limit.
Source: Munro (1990)
Untreated effluent AOX is low due to oxygen delignification, hardwood-softwood mix,
. and other process modernization; treated effluent AOX Is low due to primary and
secondary treatment.
Chlorine dioxide substitution methods are quite well known and proven in practice. The addition of small amounts of
oxygen or hydrogen peroxide Into later chlorine bieachingn/stages can be used to reduce chlorine use and may produce
organochlorlne discharges to water by as much as 15 to 2 o. x gen delignliioation can be used as a substitute for part of
the chlorination process. Resulting reductions in organochlortne ell uents are estimated at 40%.
9.4 Abatement Costs
Estimates of the costs of reducing dioxin and furan emissions to non~detection levels at Great Lakes pulp and p er
mills are shown in Table 9.5. The total ai cost for dioxin and turan control In the Canadian portion oi the Great La es
basin is estimated at 03568 million and th emails no slgnilicant change in direct grated costs. In Ontario, which hasa
total chemical pulp production level oi tout 6000 tonnes per day, total costs wi be C 84.7 million, or 034.51 per ton
i amortized capital cost). By roduct. costs will be 034.76 for market kratt, C5476 for integrated kratt and C3203 lor sulphite
pulp. Adding oxygen delign' Ication will reduce the cost or traditional external treatment systems. canal costs and operating
costs would fall in the range of 20 to 25%.
TABLE 9.5 Ontario Great Lakes Basin Dioxin /Furan Control Costs, By Mill
CHEMICAL
PULP AMORTIZED
PRODUCTION CAPITAL COST CAPITAL
MILL AND LOCATION (Tonnes/day) (CS millions) (CS/Tome)
Canadian Pacitic Forest Prod. Thunder 1.323 8.7 $1.63
Domtar Red 50 1.3 $6.45
Kimberly Clark Terrace Bay 1,200 16.1 33.33
James River-Marathon Marathon 433 14.0 38.02
EB. Eddy Forest Products Espanola 910 0.0 $0.00
Domtar Cornwall 450 1.3 $0.72
GREAT LAKES TOTAL/AVERAGE 4,366 41.4 32.35
Avera e, Excluding EB. Eddy $2.97
CANA A TOTAL (45 Mills) 30,808 567.6 34.48
Source: McC ubbin 1990






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter Summarizes the recommendations that have been put forward in the previous chapters. Despite the
considerable effort that has me into assembling data on emissions. abatement technologies and costs there is much that is
not known especraliy in relation to the discharge of mercury and P085. The absence of this information makes it difficult to
develop firm recommendations for the implementation oi economic instruments for achievrn virtual elimination of these
selected persistent toxics in the Great Lakes basin. This tactor should be born in mind since a ough the recommendations
that are offered are not likely to cause a severe impact on the industry when considered on their own, their impact could be
signiﬁcant in conjunction with other requirements ior abatement and the concerns expressed in Chwter 8 about the lack of
competitiveness of some mills.
Gerrard
1. Efforts should continue to enhance the information on sources, abatement costs and damages that is necessary for
the further appraisal and design of economic instruments.
For mercury. priority should be given to economic instruments that will reduce the use of mercury in manufacturing
process that are not closed cycles. Measurement of the use of mercury is far more relimle than measurement of the
sources and fate of mercury discha as. A tax on mercury might be the simplest incentive to administer. though to be
helpful, it would have to apply to all inns throughout Canada and the U.S. and possibly to imports lrom other countries
as well. ,
3. The feasibility of a deposit/refund System for batteries containing mercury over 30% at all mercury used in consumer
roducts) should be investigated. n particular. the prospects or develop the necessary infrastructure should be
ooked at in detail.
4. Mercury emissions from electrical utilities, copper smelters and incinerators (over 85% of all industrial sourcesi in
Canada and the US. could be subjected to an efiluent charge if the reliability oi monitoring is improved. Revenues
could be used to deal with contaminated sediments in the Great Lakes basin and other bodies of fresh water.
 
P083
5. P083 should be dealt with through regulation. There is no obvious role for the use of an economic instmment.
MN?!”
6. it is in this sector that economic instruments appear to have the most to otter. Priority should be given to the detailed
design and lurther analysis of a program at economic instruments for the pup and pmer industry consisting oi:
- Financial enforcement incentives to sipport regulations designed to virtually eliminate 2.3.7,8- TCDD/TCDF.
- A tradeabie permits scheme to reduce the use of chlorine.
- An efﬂuent charge on AOX.

























Albert-Pacific Forest industries. 1990.
Mitigative Responses
to Concerns Regarding Chlorinated Organic Compounds.
Submission to the Alberta Minister oi the Environment, Edmonton, Alberta.
Andersen. PR. and J.M. Duncanson. 1988. The investment Climate tor the Ontario Forest Products Industry. Submission on
behaii oi the Ontario Ministry oi Natural Resources to the Ontario Environmental Assessment Board Class
Environmental Assessment oi Timber Management on Crown Lands in Ontario. Toronto.
Anderson. F R.. et ai. 1977. Environmental improvement Through Economic incentives. Washington, D.C.: Resources tor
the Future.
Anderson. F J. and NC. Bonsor. 1985. The Ontario Pulp and Paper industry: A Regional Proiitabiiity Analysis. Toronto:
Ontario Economic Council.
Atkin Research institute. 1988. The Pub. Paper and Allied industries in Canada Odtviiie. Ontario.
Barrett, S. 1990. Economic instruments ior Managing Climate Change: A Survey and Analysis at Current Proposals. Prepared
for BP intemationai.
Baumoi. W.J. and WE. Oates. 1975. The Theory 01 Environmental Policy (2d ed.). Engiewood Ciiiis. New Jersey:
Prentice-Hail.
Bemda Management Services inc. and David C. Graham 8. Associates. June. 1990. "The impact oi New Environmental
Regulations on the Competitiveness oi the Canadian Pulp and Paper industry," unpublished
Bloxam. R.. et al. 1991. Modelling the Long Range Transport. Transformation and Deposition oi Mercury. Unpublished.
Bowen, ii and J.C.L. Hsu. 1990. Overview oi Emerging Technologies in Puiplng and Bleaching, Tappl Journal. September
1990: 205.
Bower, 8T. et al. 1981. incentives in Water Quality Management: France and the Ruhr Area Washington, DC: Resources
ior the Future.
Brown. GM. and R.W. Johnson. 1984. Pollution Control by Eiiiuent Charges: it Works in the Federd Reptblic oi Germanyv
Why Not in the United States? Natural Resources Journal 24: 929.
Canadian Council oi Resource and Environment Ministers. 1987. PCB Phase-Out Strategy Control Options Report.
Preliminary Report.
Ciawson, M. "Forests in the Long Sweep of American History". Science Vol. 204. pp. 1168-1174.
Coke, A. 1988. The Ontario Forest Products industry: A Statistical Analysis. Submission on behali oi the Ontario Ministry oi
Natural Resources to the Ontario Environmental Assessment Board Class Environmental Assessment 01 Timber
Management on Crown Lands in Ontario, Toronto.
Coiborn. T.E.. et ai. 1990. Great Lakes. Great Legacy? Baltimore: The conservation Foundation and The Canadian institute
tor Research on Public Policy.
Common. MS. 1989. The Choice oi Pollution Control instruments: Why is So Little Notice Taken 01 Economists'
Recommendations?. Environmental Planning A 21: 1297.






Dewees. DN 1990. Potential Uses oi Economic Environmental Policies in Ontario. Prepared ior the Taxation Policy Branch.
Ontario Ministry oi Treasury and Economics.



























Domier. 1990. Europaeische Modeli-Emissionsdatenbasls Ouicksiiberkomponenten- 1982. in Numerical Modelling oi the
Atmospheric Transport. Chemical Transionnations and Deposition of Mercury, G. Petersen, et al. Geesthacht.
Germany: GKSS~Forschungszentrum. 1990.
Downing, PB. and K. Hanl (eds). 1983. International Comparisons in implementing Pollution Laws. Boston, Kiuwer-Niihoii.
Downing. D. and S. Sessions. 1985. innovative Water Quality-Based Permitting: A Policy Perspective. Journal oi the Water
Pollution Control Association 57: 358.
Earl, P. 1990. Technology lor Reducing Organo-Chiorines in Pulp Mill Eiiiuents. Report 01 the Technological Committee to
the Great Lakes Science Advisory Board of the intemationai Joint Commission.
Ebeling. K.. 1987. Technological Developments in the Pulp and Paper industry, in The Global Forest Sector: An Analytical
erspective. M. Kallio. et al.(eds.i. Chichester, U.K.; John Wiley and Sons. 1987.
' Environment Canada. 1991. Toxic Chemicals in the Great Lakes and Associated Effects.
Environment Canada. 1990. Marketdiie Permits: U.S. Experience and Lessons for Canada
Folmer, H. and E. van ireiand. 1989. Valuation Methods and Policy Mddl'ig in Environmental Economics.
Fraas. AG. and V.G. Munie . 1989. Economic Objectives Within a Bureaucratic Decision Process: Setting Pollution Control
Requirements Undert e Clean Water Act. Joumai oi Economics and Environmental Management 17: 35.
Freeman, AM. 1990. Water Pollution Policy, in Pibiic Policies ior Environmental Protection, P.R. Portney (ed). Washington.
DC: Resources for the Future, 1990.
Freeman, AM. 1982. Air and Water Pollution Control: A Beneﬁt-Cost Assessment. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Fuller. DA. 1987. Com iiance. Avoidance. and Evasion: Emissions Control Under imperfect Eniorcement in Steam-Electric
Generation. Ran JournalotEconomics 18:124.
Hahn. R.W. 1990. Regulatory Constraints on Environmental Markets. Joumai oi Public Economics 42: 149.
Hahn. R.W. and G.L. Hester. 1989. Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program. Yale
Joumai on Reguiaion 6: 109.
Hahn. R. W. 1989. Economic Prescr'ptions for Environmental Probiems: How the Patient Followed the Doctors Orders.
Journal oi Economic Perspectives 32 95.
Hahn. R.W. and G.L. Hester. 1989. Marketdiie Permits: Lessons ior Theory and Practice. Ecology Law Ouarteriy 16: 361.
Herzog. R.W. 1976. Economic Eiticiency and Eaulty in Water Quality Control: Eiiiuent Taxes and information Requirements.
Joumai at Environmental Economics and anagement 2: 170.
Hotelling, H. 1931. The Economics oi Exhaustbie Resources. Joumai oi Political Economy 39: 137.
intemationai Environmental Monitor. 1990. Comprehensive Survey. December 1990. The Environmental Monitor, Fall 1990
Report.
international Joint Commission. Date unknown. PCBs: A Case Study. Proceedings oi a Workshop on Great Lates Research
Coordination. Report to the Council oi Great Lates Research Managers.


































































































international Joint Commission, Great Lakes Water Quality Board. 1989.
1987 Report on Great Lakes Water Quality.
Appendix 8. Great Lakes Surveillance. Windsor. Ontario.
International Joint Commission. Municipal Pretreatment Task Force. 1989. A Review of Pretreatment Program in the Great
Lakes Basin. Report to the Great Lakes Water Quality Board. Windsor.
Intemationai Joint Commission, Great Lakes Science Advisory Board. 1989. 1989 Report. Winsor. Ontario.
Jaakko Poyry. 1990. Comglementary Scientific Review oi the Proposed Alberta- Paciiic Pulp Mill Project Envrronmental
impact Assessment. repared or Alberta Research Council, Helsinki.
Jacques. AP. 1987. Sumary oi Emissions oi Antimon , Arsenic. Cadmium. Copper. Lead, Manganese, Mercury and Nickel in
Canada. lntemai report, EnvironmentCanada. awa, Ontario.
Joeres. BF. and M.H. David (eds). Buying aBetter Environment: Cost-Eliective Regulation Through Permit Trading.
Madison: University 01 Wisconsin.
Johnson. R.W. and GM. Brown. 1976. Cleaning Up Europe’s Waters: Economics, Management. and Policies. New York:
Praeger.
Kallio, M.. et alleds.) 1987. The Global Forest Sector: An Analytical Perspective. Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons.
Kneese. AK. and C. Schultze. 1975. Pollution. Prices and Public Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings institution.
Kneese. AV. and BI Bower. 1968. Managing Water Quality: Economics, Technology, institutions. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University/Resources lor the Future.
Kneese. A K. and J.L. Sweeney leds.) 1985. Handbook oi Energy and Natural Resource and Energy Economics: Vol. ill.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Lamey, L. 1990. Sources 01 Polychlorineted Biphenyi (PCB) Loadings to Late Michigan. Unpublished.
Latin, H. 1988. Good Science, Bad Regulation. and Toxic Risk Assessment. Yale Journal on Regulation 5: 89.
Leipen. C. and U.E. Simonis. 1989. Environmental Protection Expenditures: The German Example. Revista international
Sci. Econ. Com. 36:255.
Liroii, RA. 1986. Reiorrning Air Pollution Regulation: The Toll and Trouble oi EPA's Bubble. Washington. D.C.: Consevation
Foundation.
Lockwood Post. 1990. Lockwood Post's BMW, 1991.
Malik. AS. 1990. Markets lor Pollution Control When Finns are Noncompiiant. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 18: 97.
Malue% DA. 1989. Emissions Credit Trading and the incentive to Adopt New Pollution Abatement Technology. Journal oi
nvironmentai Economics and Management 16: 52.
Maiueg'.‘ DA. 1990. Weliare Consequences oi Emission Credit Trading Programs. Joumel oi Environmental Economics and
anagement 18: 19.
McGarity. TO. 1983. Media-Quality. Technology. and Cost-Beneﬁt Balancing Strategies For Health and Environmental
Regulation. Law and Contenporely Problems 46: 159.
McCubbin. N.. et ai. 1990. Economic lnpact oi Pngmsed Regulation oi Pub and Pﬁzer industry: BOD. TSM and Toxicity;
Organochiorines (AOX), Dioxins and Furans. repared for Environment Canada, Foster. Quebec.
Merriiield. J. 1990. A Critical Overview of the Evolutionary Approach to Air Pollution Abatement Policy. Joumai oi Policy
Analysis and Management 9: 367.
Mllllman. SR. and R. Prince. 1989. Firm Incentives to Promote Technological Change in Pollution Control. Joumd ot
Environmental Economics and Management 17: 293.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Russell. CS. 1979. What Can We Get From Etiiuent Charges? Polle Analysis 5: 155.
Russell. CS. et ai. 1986. Enforcing Pollution Control Laws. Washington. D.C.: Resources for the Future.
Schelilng, TC. (ed). 1983. lncentivesior Environmental Protection. Cambridge, Massachusetts, MiT Press.







Sinclair. WF. 1990. Controlling Pollution lrorn Canadian Pulp and Paper Manufacturers: A Federal PerspectiveOttawa.
Springer, AM. 1986. industrial Environmental Control: Pulp and Paper industry. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Stavins. R N ledi 1988. Proiect 88: Harnessing Market Forces To Protect Our Environment: initiatives For The New
President. Washington. DC.
Stewart. 1985. Economics, Environment, and the Limits 01 Legal Control. Harvard Environmental Law Review 9: 1.
TAPPi. 1990. Environmental issues: An Anthology at 1989. Atlanta: TAPPl Press.
Teitenberg. TH. 1985. Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reiorming Pollution Policy. Washington. D.C.: Resources tor the
Future.
Tillman. DA. 1985. Forest Products:_ Advanced Technologies and Economic Analyses. New York: Academic Press.
Tripp, MB. and DJ. Dudek. 1989. institutional Guidelines for Designing Successiul Transterdiie Rights Programs. Yale
Joumai on Regulation 6: 369.
United States. Environmental Protection Agency. 1984. Non-Point Source Pollution in the U.S. Report to U.S. Congress,
Washington. DC.
United States. Environmental Protection Agency. 1990. Summary of Technologies for the Control and reduction oi
Chlorinated organics irom the Bleached Chemical Pulping Subcategories oi the Pub and Pwer industry. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Oiiice.
United States, De artment oi Commerce. 1990. 1987 Census oi Manufactures: Geogtaphic Area Series: Minnesota
Wisconsin, li inois, Michigan, Ohio, New York. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing ice.
United States. Diganment oi Commerce. 1990. 1987 Census oi Manuiactures: Pup, Paper, and Board Mills. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. ovt. Printing Oiiice.
United States, Department oi Commerce. 1991. U.S. industrial Outlook 1991. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Otiioe.
United States, Department o1 interior. 1988. Bureau 01 Mines and Minerals Yearbook Washington D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing
Oiiice.
United States. Department oi interior. 1989. Mercury, Quarterly Mineral industry Surveys. Pittsburgh.
Uuteia. E. and N P. Black. 1990. Recycled Fber Use Expected to Grow by 41% and Reach 130 Million Tons Yearly by 2001.
Tappi Journal (July 19901250.
Value Line. 1991. Paper 8 Forest Produas industry. Value Line January 25, 1991: 915.
Victor. PA. et ai. Environmental Protection R uiation: Water Pollution Regulation: Water Pollution, and the Pulp and Paper
industry. Technical Report No.14. Econo Council oi Canada. 1981.
Wille, Steian. 1988. The Pulp, Paar and Allied industries in Canada
Willey, Z. and T. Grail. "Federal Water Policy in the United States--An Agenda tor Economic and Environmental Fieiorm', 13
Columbia Journal oi Environmental Law, 325.
Woods Gordon Man ement Consultants, The Economic and Financial Proiiie oi the Ontario Pub and Paper Sector, Ontario
Ministry 01 the nvlronment, 1987
Zaruil. Michael A. 1990. Proceedin s 01 the Technology Transier ngposium tor the
Remediation oi Contaminate sediments in the Great Lakes asin.
WP+52 (August 8/91)
 12.0 APPENDIX A: A SUMMARY OF THE
O.E.C.D. (1989) SURVEY OF

































Stbsidy for air pollution Power generation:
control equ‘pmem (90%). emacity over 50 mw.
Government technological
research (10%).

















(3.4 not for households)


































Charge too low to have incentive
impact.
Estimated that charge would have to
equal ECU 12 billion to induce
achievement of govemment targets.
Moderate effect on innovation.
About 400 plants are affected
Simple system: overhead is
less than 3% of revenues.
Low incentive effect.
Subsidies lower industry abatement
cost by anaverage of 12%.








Average treatment costs are about
4 times average charges.
There is evidence of incentive
eflects: Many firms have increased
abatement to earn lee discounts and
one-third of municipalities claim
to have improved treatment in
response to charge system.
German water quality is said to
have improved considerably Since
charges were put into effect,
Too little information.
Charge is intended to end upon
achieving full compliance
with standards.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ECU 0.20 solt drink
(other containers)
ECU 1.6 million
ECU 29nonne ECU 3 million
Up to ECU 6/tonne ECU 3.8 million





ECU 0.10/ 100 litre
ECU 1.74/ 100 Litre
ECU 0.10/ 100 litre









Market share of non‘retumahle
bottles 15 low (5%).
But the market lor non—retumzmle
plastic bottles is growing.
Collection and reprocessmg have
increased.
Charge too low to be incentive.
70% 01 waste motor Oil is collected.
1 1% 01 total orl sold is recycled.
Administrative elliciency IS high.
High incentive etlect'rveness.
Charge replaced by regulations
which adequately control waste oil.




Tax equals 5X manutmtunng cost.
But reduaion in use has been low.




























































































































































































































































container reuse to save money
Return oi deposit bottles is
normally in the 80957.; range.
Higher dwosits are required ior
relatively higher priced beverages.
lmprecise emission inventories make
assessment of effect on emrssrons
highly uncertain.
Cost savings, otten of signiﬁcant
magnitude, are frequently reported.
Administrative eiticiency is low.
$l/Canadian . 0.65 ECU = suns. (June 1, 1987)
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